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With the entry of a new regime, many people inside and outside of 
Kenya had high hopes for change. The reality has not quite lived up to 
expectations, but there have been significant improvements in several 
áreas. The granting of free primary education at the start of Kibaki's 
presidency gained the regime considerable good will and should have 
long-term positive effects. The Economic Recovery Strategy Plan 
(Kenya 2003) was drafted in the first months of 2003, and was 
subsequently accepted by donors as a replacement for the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP). The preparation of the document was 
donor-funded, but the strategy itself was based on the ruling coalition's 
political manifestó and was, therefore, home-grown, The economy has 
picked up, with the GDP growth rate rising from 0.2% in 2000 to 5.8% 
by 2005 (See Table 2.1). Population growth rates have declined from 
their highs in the 1980s to a more manageable 2.5%. The general 
atmosphere is less repressive, with lively political debate and a fair 
amount of press freedom. Nevertheless, various international human 
rights groups report violations against specific groups as well as 
continuing problems with pólice brutality and interethnic violence. 
Preliminary results from the 2005/06 Kenya Integrated Household 
Survey (Kenya 2007a) suggest some decrease in overall poverty levels, 
but with wide variations from región to región in the country. 
Table 2.1: Kenya, Selected Indicators, 2005 
Population (million) 33.4 
Population growth rate (%) 2.5 
Area (sq. kilometres) 583,000 
National Assembly (members) 224 
Ministries 29 
Foreign aid as % of GNI 4.3 
GDP per capita (US$) 530 
GDP growth rate (%) 5.8 
GDP per capita (PPP US$) 1,170 
Main economic activities Agriculture: main crops are maize, tea, 
horticulture, wheat, coffee 
Tourism: 1.5 million arrivals/year 
Mamifactaring and other services 
Main exports Horticulture, tea, coffee, manufactured 
goods 
Source: Central Burean of Statistics (2006; 2007) 
The government is organised into 29 Ministries (See Table 2.1). 
Although the main ministries have existed since Independence, there 
has been a tendency for presidents to add to them to create positions 
with which to reward those loyal to the regime. The state bureaucracy is 
inhabited by many well educated civil servants, many holding higher 
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degrees. 
The two sectors selected for this study have had their own histories. The 
first is a productive sector. The term we use - "inclusive industrial 
development" - is not widespread. We coined it in an attempt to bring 
out the importance of including all sizes and types of firms in an 
industrial strategy and, by extensión, in donor support for industrial 
development. By "inclusive" we mean industrial development that 
includes local enterprises of micro, small and médium size.2 This does 
not mean excluding large and/or foreign enterprises. On the contrary, 
research on valué chains shows that development at the two ends of the 
size spectrum oñen goes together. 
Governance refonn is not a sector in the usual sense, mainly because 
governance cuts across all sectors (Piene and Peters 2000). 
Nevertheless, with the rise of the "good governance" agenda in the 
1990s, donors have effectively created a governance sector for purposes 
of aid. The main strands of governance reform in Kenya have been first, 
the economic management and market liberalisation associated with 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and second the public sector refonns that began with the 
government downsizing under SAPS but have continued with a focus 
on anti-corruption and institution-building. Recent reforms have been 
variously defined, but DFID is probably typical in treating governance 
as "the capability of governments to get things done, how they respond 
to the needs and rights of their citizens, and how, in turn, people can 
hold their governments to account" (DFID 2006). The chief areas of 
focus have been democracy and human rights, anti-comiption, judicial 
and legal reform, strengthening of public financial management, public 
service reform, and public safety and security. 
Kenya's industrial development has been segmented and uneven, rather 
than inclusive (Pedersen and McCormick 1999). Official statistics, 
government policy, and donor aid all tended to treat médium to large 
scale firms as "industry" and micro and small ones as "informal sector". 
To get an idea of the size of the industrial sector, therefore, one has to 
2 
We recently found one other reference to "inclusive industrialisation" 
referring to India: "In India, we have launched a Grand Endeavour—based on 
the aspiration to modernise society and develop the economy in balanced, 
equitable vvays within a robustly democratic and inclusive framework which 
respects human rights and social justice. We have a unique opportunity to 
create a shining example of inclusive industrialisation for the world. We must 
not turn our face against the Great Endeavour." (Praful Bidwai, 
www.prafulbidwai.net/archives/20070129.col.htm). 
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put together two sets of figures. Médium to large scale manufacturing 
contributed approximately 10% to GDP in 2005 (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2006). Recent figures for micro and small enterprises (MSEs) 
are not available, but in 1999 when the national survey of MSEs was 
carried out, there were about 173,000 firms engaging in some form of 
manufacturing (CBS, ICEG, and K-Rep Holdings 1999). A very rough 
estimate suggests that these add another 3-5% to GDP. When 
employment rather than GDP is considered, micro and small enterprises 
far exceed larger ones in total numbers. 
2.2 Aid to Kenya 
Development assistance is motivated by more than a concern for 
development and development strategy. It is also driven by the political, 
economic, and institutional circumstances of both donors and recipients 
(Kanbur, Sandler, and Morrison 1999). This may be especially true of 
the government-to-government aid that is the subject of this study. In 
the following sections we look first at the concepts and definitions that 
are used in the study, and then at recent trends in aid to Kenya. 
2.2.1 Aid concepts and definitions 
Foreign aid is a broad term describing the help one country gives 
another through some form of donation. The donors and recipients may 
be governmental or non-governmental bodies. Donations may go 
directly from the donor to the recipient, or they may pass through other 
bodies. Furthermore, the purposes of aid differ, but are commonly 
grouped into three broad categories: relief, military aid, and 
development assistance. This study tracks a particular type of aid, 
official development assistance or ODA. 
ODA is govemment-to-government development assistance. Its 
standard technical definition is given in Box 2.1. ODA consists of 
financial flows, technical assistance, and/or commodities that are (1) 
designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main 
objective; and (2) are provided as either grants or subsidised loans 
(Radelet 2006). It is important to note that grants and loans are quite 
different financial instruments that may be expected to have different 
impacts on both donors and recipients. The actual DAC definition 
differentiates between Official Aid (OA) and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) (See Box 2.1).1 The former is available to richer 
countries and to countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union or 
its satellites. The latter is normally targeted to poorer countries (Radelet 
2006; World Bank 1998). Most discussions of foreign aid are actually 
about ODA. 
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Box 2.1: Deflnition of Official Development Assistance -
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA^ 
Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of 
Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the 
official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare 
as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having 
a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial 
flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, loans and 
credits for military purposes are excluded. 
Source: www.oecd.org/glossarv 
Aid comes in various forms. One common distinction is based on the 
way it is given. In some cases, donors deal directly with recipient 
countries through their own aid agencies. This is bilateral aid and it is 
given through agencies such as the UK's Department for International 
Development (DFID) or France's Agence Franfaise de Développement 
(AFD). In other cases, donors support programmes and projects as one 
of many donors. This is multilateral assistance and is administered by 
agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme and the 
World Bank. Of all official development assistance, roughly one-third is 
multilateral (World Bank 1998). The traditional bilateral-multilateral 
distinction no longer covers all donors. For instance, the foundations, 
trusts, and global funds that are currently growing into important 
players in the aid arena do not fit neatly into these categories. 
Aid is also distinguished by whether it supports projects or 
programmes. Project aid covers many different activities, but is 
dominated by funds directed towards interventions in health, education, 
rural development, transport and power, housing, and water supply and 
sanitation (Riddell 2007). The main purpose of such projects is to 
achieve specific and concrete outputs, with many projects attempting to 
fill gaps by providing resources, skills and systems which the recipient 
country needs but does not have. Programme aid, on the other hand, is 
broader in coverage and objectives. Two types of programme aid have 
become popular with both donors and recipients. These are sector-wide 
approaches (SWAps), in which a donor or group of donors supports a 
particular sector, such as health or education, and budget support. 
Projects and programmes must be implemented, and ODA recipients 
usually designate an implementing agency. Implementing agencies are 
mostly ministries and other government institutions; though in a few 
cases non governmental organisations implement projects on behalf of 
the government. UNDP and other international bodies sometimes act as 
6 
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implementing agencies. All implementing agencies are responsible, not 
only for project implementation, but also for monitoring and evaluation 
and for the preparation of accounts and reports on ODA utilisation. 
Aid agreements typically set out terms and conditions to be met by the 
parties. Most of these refer directly to the project or its administration. 
They are what Martens (2005) calis "input conditionalities" that restrict 
the recipient's discretion in spending the resources availed. For 
example, most agreements specify the procurement rules to be 
followed, accounting and reporting requirements, frequency and content 
of narrative reports, disposition of capital goods at the end of the 
project, and so forth. Such conditions, although the subject of much 
negotiation, are in themselves fairly uncontroversial. More onerous is 
"tied aid", a form of aid that requires the recipient to buy certain goods 
and/or services from the donor country. Aid tying is an input 
conditionality that is generally agreed to be costly. The World Bank 
(1998) estimated that tied aid reduces the valué of that assistance by 
about 25 per cent. In 2001, the OECD's DAC made a formal 
recommendation that aid to the Least Developed Countries should be 
untied (OECD 2006).3 By 2006, less than 10 per cent of total aid from 
OECD countries was tied (OECD 2007). This figure, however, must be 
treated with caution for several reasons. First, there is wide variation 
between countries in the incidence of aid tying. Countries such as the 
UK, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and Luxembourg tie less than one per 
cent of their aid, while others such as Cañada, Portugal, and Greece tie 
between 25 and 40 per cent. Second, the largest single OECD donor, the 
United States, was not included in the data, yet it is known to tie nearly 
three-quarters of its aid (Centre for Global Development 2006). Finally, 
new donors such as China and South Korea are emerging. Some of 
these tie aid. For example, informal sources suggest that most, if not all, 
of China's infrastructure aid is tied to the use of Chinese construction 
companies. 
The other broad type of condition is the "output conditionality" that is 
linked to changes in the recipient's behaviour and institutions (Martens 
2005). Examples of output conditionalities are requirements to reform 
certain institutions, establish new policies, or remove what the donor 
believes are inappropriate rules and regulations. These were the types of 
conditionalities that accompanied Structural Adjustment credits and 
3 This recommendation applied to balance of payments and structural adjustment 
support, debt forgiveness, sector and multi-sector programme assistance, investment 
project aid, import and commodity support, commercial services contracts, and ODA to 
non-governmental organisations for procurement related activities. It exeludes technical 
co-operation and food aid. 
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became major sources of tensión between donors and aid recipients in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Both multilateral and bilateral aid is subject to 
output conditionalities. In some cases the conditionalities imposed by 
bilateral aid organisations reflect the particular political concerns or 
priorities of the donor country; in others they mirror conditionalities 
imposed by the World Bank or other multilateral organisations. China 
difFers from DAC countries in the form of its output conditionalities. In 
contrast tothe emphasis of Western donors on norms of human rights 
and liberal democracy, China asserts the importance of economic rights 
and rights of subsistence, but espouses a policy of political non-
interference (Taylor 2007). It does, however, insist that recipients 
adhere to its "One China" policy by refusing diplomatic recognition to 
Taiwan (Chínese Taipei). 
2.2.2 Recent aid trends in Kenya 
Development aid is governed by a complex network of institutions and 
actors that aróse in the period immediately following World War II and 
Figure 2.1: Net ODA to Kenya, Selected Years 
Net ODA to Kenya, selected years 
1 800 
1 600 
1 400 
1 200 
c 
I 1 000 
E 
</> 800 (O 3 
600 
400 
200 
0 
1989-90 1994-95 2002 2003 2004 2005 
average average 
Year 
Source: OECD, DAC Data 2005, www.oecd.org 
1 549 
768 755 
664 l i l i 
8 
IDS Working Paper No. 546 
has been subsequently shaped and re-shaped by major events both 
within and outside the country being assisted. Aid to Kenya dropped 
drastically in the 1990s (see Figure 2.1). This was a reflection both of 
Kenya's own falling out with the donors over the implementation of 
Structural Adjustment, and the general decline in aid to Africa 
following the end of the Cold War (Hjertholm and White 2000; 
KIPPRA and ODI 2005; O'Brien and Ryan 2001). From US$ 1,549 
million in 1989-90, aid had dropped by 50 per cent to US$768 million 
in 1994-95.4 The picture during the period of our study, however, was 
different. Aid, which had reached a very low level by the end of the 
1990s, was steadily rising. Nevertheless, with total aid at approximately 
4.3 per cent of GNI in 2005, Kenya is not considered to be a highly aid-
dependent country. 
Not reflected in these figures is aid from countries that do not belong to 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Of these, China 
is probably the most significant, especially in the area of infrastructure 
assistance. 
Section 3 
Literature Review 
This section examines the growing literature on the related topics of 
proliferation of projects and donors, and the various attempts to 
rationalise them through coordination. A final section lays out the 
conceptual framework for the study. The literature is vast and growing. 
This review is confined to that part of the literature that deals with the 
forms and extent of donor and project proliferation and the efforts of 
donors and recipient countries to coordinate aid. It does not include the 
effects of proliferation and coordination on state capacity. We save this 
discussion for a further paper. 
3.1 Donor and Project Proliferation: Forms, Extent, Consequences 
The availability of many donors and projects can in principie be 
positive. Donors have different strengths, and access to several of them 
provides recipient countries with diversification and some assurance of 
a steady flow of resources. There are, however, many problems 
associated with the proliferation of donors and projects that tend to 
undermine aid effectiveness and waste the scarce human and financial 
resources of recipient governments. Unfortunately, much of the 
discussion has been less than precise about terminology and about the 
particular issues flowing from proliferation. The following sections 
4 Amounts are in constant 2004 US dollars. 
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attempt to sort through the growing literature and to draw from it the 
concepts and issues needed to further our understanding of the effects of 
donor and project proliferation. 
3.1.1 Forms of proliferation 
Proliferation of donors and proliferation of projects are closely related, 
but not identical. We look first at the proliferation of donors. Donor 
proliferation can be considered at the global level. In 1980 there were 
already over 80 bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental 
organisations providing significant amounts of development assistance 
to African countries. The world total of official donor agencies is now 
approaching 200 and results in a web of projects and individual 
transactions so complex that it is hard to imagine (Riddell 2007). 
Alternatively, donor proliferation can be defined as the extent to which 
a given aid donor disperses its aid budget among a portfolio of potential 
recipients (Acharya, de Lima, and Moore 2004). This is especially 
useful when the aim is to examine the behaviour of different aid donors 
and the impact of that behaviour on aid effectiveness. For our purposes, 
however, still a third definition of donor proliferation is needed, one 
that reflects our focus on the recipient country. Drawing on a dictionary 
definition of proliferation as "rapid and often excessive spread or 
increase (Dictionary.com. 2007), we define donor proliferation as the 
rapid increase in the number of donors giving aid to any one recipient 
country. 
Project proliferation often accompanies donor proliferation, but is 
conceptually a distinct phenomenon with its own particular problems. 
Project proliferation is the multiplication of projects, which may result 
from having many donors, each with a few projects, or from the 
multiplication of projects by a single donor (Morss 1984; Roodman 
2006a). There appears to be no single definition of an aid project, but it 
is generally agreed that projects are limited in duration and objectives. 
We therefore consider a project to be "a unique venture with a 
beginning and an end, undertaken by people to meet established goals 
within defined constraints of time, resources, and quality."(Ohio State 
University 2004) The main purpose of most ODA-funded development 
projects is to achieve specific and concrete outputs. Many play some 
sort of 'gap-filling' role by providing resources, skills, and systems 
which the recipient country lacks (Riddell 2007). Project aid can be 
distinguished from programme aid, which is broader in both aims and 
time frame. Programme aid, according to the OECD (2005a), consists 
of financial contributions, not linked to specific project activities, 
extended to a partner country for general development purposes, such as 
balance of payment support or general budget support. It is often 
10 
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associated with the promotion of policy reforms at the macroeconomic 
level and/or in specific sectors. 
3.1.2 Extent and consequences of proliferation 
The aid literature is filled with stories of poor countries that have 
hundreds of projects from dozens of bilateral and multilateral donors 
(Acharya, de Lima, and Moore 2004; Knack and Rahman 2004; Riddell 
2007; UNDP 2005; van de Walle and Johnston 1996). On average each 
aid-recipient country receives aid from 26 official donors (Riddell 
2007). Only 13 per cent of recipients have fewer than nine donors, and a 
quarter of recipients have 30 or more (Acharya, de Lima, and Moore 
2004). 
The numbers of donors and projects appear to have increased over time, 
and although there are some benefits to this increased variety, these are 
largely outweighed by the problems caused by proliferation. The chief 
benefit of proliferation is the variety of offerings múltiple donors bring 
to recipient countries. Such variety can be helpful, but it may also 
reduce the potential impact of aid by creating overlap, duplication and 
inconsistency across aid projects and programmes (Riddell 2007). The 
variety of donors may also make the process of establishing good 
working relationships between donors and recipients more challenging. 
If as some argüe, relationship management is as important as money 
management (Eyben 2006), donor proliferation may be one reason why 
aid fails to meet its objectives. 
The consequences of donor and project proliferation actually lie outside 
the scope of the present investigation. Nevertheless, we touch on this 
literature in order to place the work more firmly in the ultimate context 
of state capaeity. The main consequences of donor proliferation are its 
negative effeets on the recipient government, both the immediate effects 
on work load and transactions costs, and the long-term impact on state 
capacity. To manage aid well, governments are expected to set up a 
specialised bureaueraey and ensure that all aid passes through this office 
(Cassen and Associates 1994). This may well put extreme pressure on 
governments that are increasingly expected to be lean and efficient. 
Most discussions of proliferation focus on the increased transactions 
costs including review of documents, report writing, accounting, 
múltiple meetings with both local donor staff and visitors from home 
offices, as well as various activities designed to attract future aid 
(Acharya, de Lima, and Moore 2004; Knack and Rahman 2004; Moss, 
Pettersson, and van de Walle 2006; Roodman 2006b; van de Walle and 
Johnston 1996). 
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Bigsten (2006) points out that although there is a great deal of useful 
information about the transactions costs associated with donor and 
project proliferation, there is little empirical evidence showing the size 
of these costs. An exception to this is the study undertaken by Brown et 
al. (2000) of aid transaction costs in Viet Nam. This study sought to 
identify transaction costs of aids in Viet Nam through a combination of 
detailed questionnaires and interviews with government and donor 
officials at all levels of aid delivery. The study noted that all aid, even 
programme aid, leads to transaction costs. It also observed that, 
compared to the overall volume of aid, direct transaction costs are not 
likely to be very substantial. Furthermore, some of the costs are not 
unique to aid-funded activities, but are shared by ordinary government 
projects. Nevertheless there are transaction costs that can be traced 
specifically to the aid process. They occur at different stages in the 
project cycle, they take different forms, and their magnitude varies 
depending on not only on the aid package itself, but also on the nature 
of the donor and recipient organisations.5 
There is growing recognition that increasing amounts of aid have long-
term negative effects on the institutions of recipient states (Brautigam 
and Knack 2004; Morss 1984; Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle 
2006). Morss (1984) identified the process of "institutional destruction" 
associated with the proliferation of donors and projects. He notes, not 
only the costs of keeping track of projects, monitoring their progress, 
and interacting with the donors, but also the institutional destruction 
that is the by-product of the outpouring of project initiatives. He also 
identifies the unrealistic expectations of donors, the blurring of lines of 
authority within government, and the lost opportunities for learning 
from project implementation as indicators of the destruction of 
government institutions. In some cases, aid agencies negotiate in their 
own way with individual ministries, which defeats attempts at overall 
control (Cassen and Associates 1994; UNDP 2005). Other paths to 
institutional destruction include the tendency for aid agencies to poach 
the best government staff (Cassen and Associates 1994; van de Walle 
and Johnston 1996), the formation of parallel institutions to handle 
financial and general project administration, the substitution of aid for 
local tax revenues, donor competition and ever changing aid fashion 
(Cassen and Associates 1994); and the donor conditionalities which 
allow little space for government to experiment with its own policy 
development (Brautigam and Knack 2004; Moss, Pettersson, and van de 
5 The literature on transaction costs will be explored in more detail in the next 
phase of this research. 
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Walle 2006; van de Walle and Johnston 1996).6 
3.2 Donor Coordination: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Extent 
Coordination is a vaguely positive term that needs specification to be 
useful andytically. This section first reviews the concepts used in the 
donor coordination discussion, discusses some of the most relevant 
coordinating mechanisms, and finally touches briefly on the extent of 
coordination. 
3.2.1 Donor coordination concepts 
One difficulty in attempting to review the literature on donor 
coordination is that the term is used in several different ways. For some 
it is the coordination of the donors, discussing and agreeing among 
themselves what will be funded and who will fund what portion of the 
overall aid. For others it is an interactive process that also involves the 
recipient government, which provides input regarding government 
priorities. To tnake matters more complicated, terms like coordination, 
harmonisation, and alignment are sometimes used as synonyms and at 
others to represent distinct concepts, such as coordination for donors 
working among themselves and alignment for the donor-recipient 
discussions. In this section, we will review the relevant literature, noting 
the meaning given to the terms used. In section 3.3 we indícate how the 
terms will be used in our analysis. 
Club du Sahel (2000) provides a useful overarching definition: "Aid 
coordination refers to any institutional interface between a set of donors 
and partner recipient organisations." Only two studies attempt working 
definitions of coordination or harmonisation (Balogun 2005; de Renzio 
et al. 2005). Both start with a pyramid that has harmonisation" as its 
base (see figure 3.1). At the next level is "alignment", and finally at the 
apex, "ownership". For de Renzio et al. the pyramid seems to represent 
harmonization, while Balogun labels it the "Aid Effectiveness 
Pyramid". Balogun (2005) points to the fact that the term harmonisation 
has two usages within the international community. The first is as a 
synonym for the range of activities related to strengthening partnerships 
with partner governments. In this sense it includes the concepts of 
country ownership, alignment, and a narrower definition of 
harmonisation (as being something between donors) within it. That 
narrower definition is the second common usage of the term, namely 
that harmonisation is the negotiation and eventual agreement among 
donors about priorities for aid to a particular recipient country. 
6 The literature on state capacity will be explored in more detail in the second 
phase of the research. 
13 
IDS Working Paper No. 546 
The aid effectiveness pyramid offers insights into aid coordination at 
country level. At its most basic, coordination involves establishing 
common procedures that allow donors to work together with each other 
as well as with Government. These harmonised procedures are the 
foundation of any coordination effort. The next level is alignment, in 
which the donors allow the Government's agenda and systems to drive 
the aid process. For example, instead of the recipient having to adopt 
the donor's financial year and reporting systems, the recipient's year 
and systems are used. In order to achieve this, the recipient may, in 
some cases, have to strengthen its systems to bring them into 
conformity with international standards. Finally, the ultimate goal of 
any coordination effort is that the projects and/or programmes no longer 
"belong" to the donors, but are government-driven with support from 
donors. This is ownership. 
Figure 3.1: Aid Effectiveness Pyramid 
Ownership 
Align with 
partner's 
agenda 
Relying on 
partner's 
systems 
Alignment 
Establishing 
common 
arrange-
ments 
Simpiifying 
procedures 
Sharing 
informatio 
Harmonisation 
Sowce: Balogun (2005); de Renzio et al (2005) 
There are also forms of coordination that transcend individual countries. 
These broader forms of coordination include the multilateral agencies 
themselves, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, as well 
as international attempts to set a comprehensive aid agenda. The 
Millennium Development Goals are a current example of the latter. At 
country level, the main forms of coordination mentioned in the 
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literature are consultative groups of donors, donor roundtables, sector 
level meetings and working groups, and the internal bureaucracies of 
both donors and recipient governments. 
3.2.2 Dono* coordination mechanisms 
Since this study is a country case study, we will focus our attention on 
country-level coordination. Aid coordination began to be formalised 
with the establishment of the DAC in 1960. By the mid 1980s some 
twenty countries had Consortia or Consultative Groups, mostly under 
the aegis of the World Bank (Cassen and Associates 1994). These were 
oriented to macro-economic and major sectoral issues. Their annual 
meetings included sénior officials of the recipient country, but were very 
much donor led meetings. 
Table 3.2: Typology of Aid Co-ordinating Mechanisms 
FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA 
GEOGRAPHIC 
CRITERIA 
Inter-
agency 
Fora 
Strategic 
Planning 
Frameworks 
Platforms 
Operational 
Co-
ordination 
Global DAC 
CGIAR 
CGAP 
Regional 
& sub-
regional 
ECA 
SIA 
SPA 
ADEA 
Club du 
Sahel 
CMA 
FAD 
Single 
country 
CDF-PRSP 
IJNDAF 
Consultative 
Groups 
Round 
Tables 
Local/ 
sectoral 
Sector Programmes 
Source: Club du Sahel (2000) 
Changes in the international context, especially in the latter half of the 
1990s, encouraged coordination efforts. The Club du Sahel (2000) 
points to three factors. The decline in ODA during the 1990s led donors 
to seek effíciency gains through improved coordination. Growing 
concentration of partners in particular sectors and countries and the 
overall increase in the number of development actors heightened the 
need for coordination. The result, somewhat paradoxically, was the 
development of "a complex thicket of co-ordination mechanisms and 
initiatives" (Club du Sahel 2000). These can be roughly classified by 
geographical scope and function (see Table 3.2). Using the geographical 
lens, initiatives can be grouped at four levels: global, regional and sub-
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regional, single country, and sectoral. By function, coordinating 
mechanisms can be divided into inter-agency fora, strategic planning 
frameworks, consultation platforms, and operational coordination. We 
note, however, that strategic planning frameworks function somewhat 
differently from the other three. The main elements pertinent to this 
study are DAC, a global inter-agency forum; the African regional 
bodies such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); and the 
single-country and sectoral mechanisms. 
DAC is the main global body that aims to improve aid coordination. It 
does this through high-level pieetings, peer review, and thematic 
networks. The OECD Development Directorate provides administrative 
support to the DAC. The UN has a range of institutions that attempt to 
facilítate aid coordination in Africa. Among these are the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), Special Initiative for Africa (SIA), 
Strategic Partnership for Africa (SPA), and Association for the 
Development of Education in Africa (ADEA). 
Strategic planning frameworks are institutions set up to be used across 
countries. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is a good 
example. Developed by the World Bank, the framework became a 
condition for receiving certain types of IMF and World Bank funding. 
As a planning document it required partners to agree on objectives, 
development cooperation, implementation mechanisms, allocation of 
resources, and the creation of systems to monitor performance. The 
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) has the 
more limited goal of strengthening the coordination of the action of the 
various UN agencies working on development within a given country 
(Club du Sahel 2000). 
Consultation platforms are co-ordinating arrangements for discussions 
in which a wide range of partners from North and South meet regularly 
to build a consensus on development strategies (Club du Sahel 2000). 
Platforms operate at different levels. The most relevant for this research 
are the national platforms, generally coordinated by the World Bank or 
UNDP. The World Bank calis them Consultative Groups and UNDP, 
Round Tables. They are two-day conferences held roughly every fifteen 
months, attended by a recipient country's political authorities and 
representatives of the multilateral and bilateral donors financing 
development activities in that country. The World Bank and UNDP 
provide the conference secretariat. Although previously the organising 
body also chaired the meetings which were held in Paris or Geneva, the 
DAC now recommends that the meetings take place in the recipient 
country with that country assuming responsibility for chairing and 
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organising the agenda (OECD 2003a). 
Operational coordination consists of specific activities designed to 
strengthen the practices and procedures of donors and recipient 
governments in order to enable them to work together more effectively. 
In general, they can be divided into three groups: practices between 
donor agencies, practices within the recipient country, and practices 
involving both donors and recipients (OECD 2003a). They include 
various specific measures such as strengthening recipient government's 
capacity to manage aid, harmonising donors' technical and 
administrative procedures with those of the recipient country, and 
strengthening sectoral and multi-sectoral coordination. 
The final coordination approach mentioned in the literature is the 
sector-wide approach or SWAp. SWAps began to be formally promoted 
in the mid to late 1990s (Riddell 2007). They cut across at country level 
the three functional categories of strategic planning frameworks, 
platforms, and operational coordination (see Table 3.2). Two elements 
characterise a SWAp: the involvement of donor agencies in supporting 
a sector-wide strategy that is led by the recipient government, and an 
agreement between donors and the recipient government on the broad 
outline for implementing and managing the sector strategy within a 
medium-term expenditure framework (Riddell 2007). SWAps are 
particularly prominent in support of the health, education, water, and 
agricultural sectors, but by the early 2000s had begun to be applied to 
governance reform.7 
3.2.3 Extent of coordination 
Most of the literature implies that there is very little coordination of 
donors or projects. UNDP (2005), for example, says that "all too often, 
severely constrained government departments in aid recipient countries 
have to deal with large numbers of weakly coordinated donors ..." 
(emphasis added). Bigsten (2006), Birdsall (2005) and others imply lack 
of coordination when they point to the need for new efforts to offset the 
problems arising from many different donors, each concerned with its 
own objectives. Some, such as van de Walle and lohnston (1996) and 
Cuong (2005), describe particular coordination efforts, but do not 
indícate whether these cover all donors and/or all projects in a given 
sector. In other words, information on the extent of coordination is 
7 A review of Ireland's 2000-2003 country strategy in Uganda mentions a 
SWAp in governance in that country. 
(http://www.dci.gov.ie/Uploads/URandaExcSumfin.coc. 
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scanty and what exists gives only a partial picture. 
Literature on the extent of coordination also suffers from the varying 
perspectives of the authors, some of which are strongly held but not 
evidence-based. For some, coordination is completely positive, and the 
only problem is that there is not enough of it. DAC is typical of this 
view, but it is present in the academic literature as well. Others take a 
more sceptical view of coordination. Birdsall (2005), for example, states 
that "the idea of solving the problem by greater 'coordination' would 
ideally yield to much more fundamental change." Still others see that 
coordination could actually have negative consequences. For instance, 
Torsvik (2005) demonstrates that the effect of donor cooperation 
depends critically on the nature of the interaction among donors and 
policymakers in the country that receives aid. Lack of donor-recipient 
alignment may actually result in a reduction of total resources to the 
donors' target group. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
The foregoing review of literature combined with two main bodies of 
theory gives rise to a conceptual framework for our study of the effects 
of donor proliferation and coordination on state capacity. It is important 
to recognise that the framework is intended to guide the entire study, 
but this paper deals with only part of the story, and therefore, part of the 
framework. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness we present the 
entire model. 
The first and most fundamental of the bodies of theory are those that 
assert that the way society is organised (in short, the institutions of 
society) determines its performance and development outcomes (Nabli 
and Nugent 1989; North 1990; Ostrom 2005; Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti 1993). Institutions shape human interactions, including the 
interactions within and between donor agencies, recipient governments, 
NGOs, and other actors in the aid system (Gibson et al. 2005; Martens 
et al. 2002). Key concepts include: rules, enforcement by agents, 
distinction between institutions and organisations, norms, strategies, 
and incentives. Institutionalism is far from uniform. It cuts across 
academic disciplines, where its variants are distinguished by their focus 
on economic, political, or social variables. Even within disciplines 
institutional approaches are characterised by competing points of view. 
This paper is situated within the broad stream of institutional political 
economy, but we intend to explore alternative approaches more fully in 
a fiiture conceptual paper. 
Complementing the institutional theories are theories identifying 
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complexity and non-linear relationships as key to understanding societal 
change (Rihani 2002). A central insight from complexity analysis is that 
the interplay between rules and agents leads to outcomes that are not 
readily predictable from understanding the individual actors alone 
(Groves and Hinton 2004). Using the approach requires understanding 
not only the choices made by individual actors and their position and 
power within the system, but also of the relationships and networks 
between actors and the system as a whole. Since with each interaction, 
relationships evolve and all parties to the relationship are changed, 
systems are oñen depicted as irregular and fluid, rather than by the 
conventional organisational or flow chart. The emphasis on 
relationships also allows for explicit attention to other concepts such as 
power and learning in the aid system (Eyben 2006). 
At a practical level, the literature suggests three types of interactions: 
those within the donor group, those within government, and those 
between donors and government. Figure 3.2 presents a model that 
attempts to capture these interactions. At the top, the circles represent 
the donors. Some are individual, while others have joined into donor 
groups. Groupings may be fixed or fluid, and actual levels of donor 
participation may vary, but the stated purpose is for donors to discuss 
and agree among themselves on priorities for programmes and projects. 
This is donor harmonisation. Ungrouped donors do not particípate 
formally in such discussions, though they may have some informal 
communications among themselves and with grouped donors. 
All donors - the grouped and the ungrouped - relate in some way to the 
donor-recipient alignment mechanisms. Alignment, as indicated abo ve, 
refers to the relationship between donors' actions, policies, approaches 
and those of the recipient government. It consists of two main parts: 
donor alignment with recipient's development agenda, and donor 
reliance on recipient's systems. The mechanisms are simply the ways 
donors and recipients have developed to work together. They may 
include committees, thematic groups, individual meetings, document 
sharing, parallel organisations, and a host of other practical activities 
that either contribute to alignment or detract from it. In an ideal world, 
there is congruence between donor and recipient agendas, and recipient 
systems are perceived as adequate for the management of donor funds. 
In such a case it is possible to speak of government ownership of the 
funded activities. 
The aligmnent mechanisms singly and taken together have an impact on 
the capacity of the recipient government at two levels. The most 
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important is the state's strategic capacity, i.e., the ability of the state to 
design policies and programmes, and implement them in an 
authoritative and binding fashion. The second is the more mundane area 
of general public administration, including the government's ability to 
manage internal and external financial resources, and the closely related 
ability to procure needed goods and services in an efficient and 
transparent manner. 
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework 
Both aspects of state capacity, in turn, feed back into donor recipient 
alignment. The level of the government's strategic capacity determines 
the quality of the development agenda with which donors are supposed 
to align themselves. At a practical level, the strategies and plans 
developed by government become the documents which are to be 
shared and form the agenda for the various types of meetings. The 
quality of these has an impact on alignment. The extent of public 
administration capabilities similarly feeds back into the alignment 
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process, making donors more or less receptive to using recipient-
country financial and procurement systems. 
The final level of our model is the most crucial, but actually lies outside 
the scope of this research. State capacity is believed to play a major role 
in the development outcomes experienced in the country,' and these 
outcomes in turn feed back into the capacity of the state. 
Section 4 
Methodology 
This section shows how the information needed to answer the research 
questions was collected and analysed. It also presents some of the 
challenges encountered by the researchers in carrying out such a study. 
The research was designed to be carried out in two phases. Phase 1, 
reported in this paper, focuses on gathering empirical data to answer 
two sets of research questions: 
1. To what extent has there been a proliferation of donors and 
projects? Has it increased over time? 
2. To what extent has there been donor co-ordination and what 
form has it taken? 
The study uses both quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection and analysis. The study's time frame is the period 2000-2005 
inclusive, meaning that all projects active at any time during this period 
are included in the study. , The period was selected by working 
backwards from 2005, which was the latest year for which complete 
data could be expected to be available. Going back to 2000 gave six full 
years of coverage, with the change of government regime coming mid-
way through the period. 
Answering the first research question required compiling a list of all 
projects active in each sector between 2000 and 2005. The list included 
information such as project title, foreign donor agency, national 
counterpart, implementing agencies, project status, target group, 
specific objectives, core activities, funding, disbursements, and the 
geographical location of the project (see Appendix 1 for the template 
used). The point of entry for assembling such a list was the Ministry of 
Finance, Department of External Resources (ERD), which in Kenya is 
the central coordinating body for foreign aid. To gain access to the 
information, three levels of approval were required: "research 
clearance" from the Ministry of Science and Technology, a letter of 
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authority from the Permanent Secretary, Ministiy of Finance, and a 
letter of introduction from the Director, External Resources Department. 
It took the team four months (early August to early December 2006) to 
obtain these documents. Data collection in the Department of External 
Resources began in mid December 2006. 
The actual process of collecting the data was challenging. It involved 
making contact with each of the twelve divisions (donor "desks") 
located within the ERD to obtain the relevant files, reading the files, and 
for those that fell within the scope of the project, completing the 
template. After examining the first group of files, the team developed a 
system for identifying relevant projects by looking for lcey words in the 
project title and/or objectives. Among the key words in governance 
reform, for example, were governance, anti-corruption, community 
participation, gender responsiveness, public service, public finance, 
democracy, and human rights. The comparable list for inclusive 
industrialisation had terms such as private sector, micro, small and/or 
médium enterprise, entrepreneurship, income generation. As a further 
check, we also examined the target group and implementing agencies 
for their relevance to the sector concerned. 
After some initial reluctance to give information, the officers in ERD 
were very helpful. Nevertheless, identifying relevant files and working 
around the schedules of the relevant officers was challenging. Poor and 
inconsistent record keeping, especially for completed projects, made 
finding all of the files difficult. In some cases information required for 
completing the project template was not available or had to be gathered 
from various places. The fact that the officers had many duties and 
could be out of the office for meetings, training, or other reasons meant 
that the work sometimes proceeded very slowly. The team used a 
variety of techniques to compénsate for these problems, including using 
other sources of information to triangúlate and fill gaps, helping to clear 
a store where oíd files were kept, and remaining positive and patient 
when appointments were delayed or brolcen. The bulle of the data 
collection was completed by late May, but our analysis suggests that 
some gaps remain, and these are being foliowed. 
Data from the templates were entered into an Excel spreadsheet. This 
made the data easier to handle and facilitated its sharing between 
Nairobi and Brighton. Preliminary review of the data allowed the team 
to refine the criteria for selecting projects as either governance or 
inclusive industrialisation. A total of 170 projects were selected and 
logged, but some of these were subsequently dropped as not fitting the 
criteria. In the end a total of 135 projects were retained: 92 on 
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governance and 43 on inclusive industrialisation. Throughout this 
process data cleaning and filling of gaps continued. 
Primary data were also collected through key informant interviews with 
both donor agencies and government ministries and departments (see 
Appendix 2 for list). The aim is to interview as many as possible of the 
donors, counterparts, and implementing agencies active in these sectors. 
The interviews were guided by two interview schedules; one for donor 
agencies and another for government officers (see Appendix 3). Both 
contained open-ended questions under the following broad themes: 
overview of donor and project proliferation, b) effects of proliferation, 
and c) attempts to overcome donor and project proliferation. Notes were 
taken and circulated after each interview. 
Secondary data were collected through review of published and 
unpublished works, including books, journal articles, academic papers, 
government documents, project reports and evaluations, and 
government and donor websites. 
The Excel spreadsheet containing the final list of the projects was the 
basis for the quantitative data analysis of donor proliferation. 
Governance and inclusive industrialisation data were analysed 
separately, and frequency distributions in table and chart form were 
produced for each of the main variables. Qualitative data were analysed 
thematically. Data on donor proliferation were mainly used to 
complement the quantitative analysis. Data on coordination were 
separated into four groups depending on whether they related to 
coordination within the donor group, coordination within the 
government, coordination between donor and government, or other 
related matters. A stakeholders' workshop, held in Nairobi in July 2007, 
provided an opportunity to gather further information and to refine our 
analysis. 
Section 5 
Findings on Donor and Project Proliferation 
This section examines the analysis of the data on donor proliferation, 
first for the inclusive industrialisation projects and then for governance 
projects. Data used in the analysis are given in Appendices 4 and 5 
respectively. 
5.1 Inclusive Industrialisation Projects and Donors 
The period 2000 to 2005 saw a significant change in the numbers of 
both projects and donors in the area of inclusive industrialisation. The 
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number of active projects more than quadrupled; from 8 in the year 
2000 to 33 in 2005 (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Active Inclusive Industrialisation Projects by Year, 2000-
2 005 
Year No. of Active Projects 
2000 8 
2001 10 
2002 15 
2003 17 
2004 26 
2005 33 
Source: Own data, 2007 
Table 5.2: Projects Funded by Foreign Donor Agencies in Support of 
Inclusive Industrialisation in Kenya, 2000-2005 
Foreign Donor Number of Projects 
Bilateral Donors 23 
1 USA / USAID 8 
2 Germany / GTZ 4 
3 UK / DFID 4 
4 France/AFD 3 
5 Denmark / DANIDA 3 
6 Netherlands 1 
Multilateral Donors 20 
7 UNDP 9 
8 The World Bank/IDA 7 
9 EC/EU 2 
10 IFAD 1 
11 ILO 1 
TOTAL 43 
Source: Own data, 2007 
Eleven different donors supported these projects (see Table 5.2). Of 
these six there bilateral: US AID (USA), GTZ (Germán), DFID (UK), 
DANIDA (Denmark), AFD (France), and the Netherlands. Five were 
multilateral agencies: UNDP, the World Bank, the European Union, 
IFAD, and ILO. Taken together the bilateral agencies had the largest 
number of projects (23), but the largest single donors were multilaterals. 
Table 5.3 shows how the 43 projects were distributed across the years 
between 2000 and 2005. The overall picture is one of a fairly steady 
increase in donors and projects over the entire period. Of the eleven 
donors who supported inclusive industrialisation projects during the 
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period, six were active in the year 2000. UNDP and the World Bank 
each had two projects, while the remaining four had one project each. In 
2001, the same six donors were active, with the World Bank and the EU 
adding one new project each. In 2002, USAID brought three new 
projects, and Germany and the World Bank added one project each. In 
2003, the addition of DFID and the ILO brought the number of active 
donors to nine. The same nine donors were active in 2004, but with 
more projects. USAID, UNDP, and the World Bank all increased the 
number of projects supported. In 2005, two "new" donors entered the 
sector, AFD with three projects and the Netherlands with one. It should 
be noted that some of these donors were not actually new to the sector. 
DFID, USAID, and the Netherlands all had a significant presence in 
business development services and microfinance projects in the late 
1990s, but shiñed their priorities in the early 2000s. France, UK, and 
the US more than doubled their total aid between 2000 and 2005 
(www.oecd/dac/statistics/).8 With more money to spend they may well 
have been looking for viable projects in different areas. 
Table 5.3: Active Inclusive Industrialisation Projects by Donor by 
Year, 2000-2005 
Donor Number of Active Projects 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
USA / USAID 3 4 7 8 
Germany / GTZ 1 1 2 3 3 2 
UK / DFID 1 1 4 
France/AFD 3 
Denmark / D ANIDA 1 1 1 1 • 1 3 
Netherlands 1 
UNDP 2 2 2 2 7 5 
The World Bank/IDA 2 3 4 2 3 3 
EC/EU 1 2 2 2 2 2 
IFAD 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ILO 1 1 1 
TOTAL 8 10 15 17 26 33 
Source: Own data, 2007 
The increase in projects was greater than the increase in donors, as can 
be seen in figure 5.1. 
8 France's total ODA increased from US$ 4,105 million in 2000 to US$ 10,026 in 2005; 
the UK's total ODA increased from US$4,501 million in 2000 to US$10,767 million in 
2005, and the US increased its ODA from US$9,995 million in 2000 to US$ 27,622 
million in 2005. 
25 
IDS Working Paper No. 546 
Figure 5.1: Inclusive Industrialisation: Donors and Projects 2000-2005 
Inclusive Industrialisation: Donors and 
Projects, 2000-2005 
35 -r 
0 -I 1 1 1 1 1 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Year 
Source: Own data 
Table 5.4: Active Inclusive Industrialisation Projects by Implementing 
Agency by Year, 2000-2005 
Implementing Agency Number of Active Projects 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
National Agencies 
MOF 1 1 1 3 
MOT&I 1 1 4 7 11 18 
MRTT&T 1 1 
MOA 1 1 3 3 3 4 
MOLHRD 5 5 5 3 3 1 
MOLG 1 
MOHA 1 1 1 1 
MOTW 1 1 1 1 1 
ATIA 1 1 1 1 1 
ITDG-EA 1 1 
Equity Building Society 1 
K-Rep Bank 1 
Co-op Bank v. 1 
Gallman 1 1 
International Agencies 
UNIDO 1 
UNCTAD 1 1 
ITC 1 1 
Total No. of Agencies 5 7 7 7 12 13 
No of National Agencies 5 7 7 7 9 11 
Source: Own data, 2007 
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In fací, the donors in this sector have remained fairly consistent. Not 
only are the numbers of donors nearly constant, but these numbers also 
represent largely the same actors. This is positive, but its coupling with 
a proliferation of projects and implementing agencies may offset this 
apparent stability. 
The number of implementing agencies has grown from five in 2000 to 
13 in 2005 (see Table 5.4). Furthermore, the mix of agencies has 
changed considerably. In 2000 all implementing agencies were 
government ministries, with the Ministry of Labour and Human 
Resource Development implementing or co-implementing five of that 
year's nine active projects. By 2005, the implementation was widely 
spread among thirteen agencies. Eleven of these were national, but only 
five were government ministries. The Ministries of Finance, Trade and 
Industry, Agriculture, Labour and Human Resource Development, and 
Tourism and Wildlife managed a total of twenty-seven projects, with 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry accounting for two-thirds of these. 
Two international and six local or regional organisations were 
implementing the remaining six projects. 
Finally it is useful to examine what the projects are designed to do in 
this sector. In the 1990s, projects aimed at small enterprise development 
could usually be grouped into a few categories, including business 
development services, micro-finance, skill training, and infrastructure 
provision. These categories need modification to accommodate the 
more inclusive approach to industrial development outlined earlier. Our 
examination of the 28 projects in our study suggested the five categories 
shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Inclusive Industrialisation Projects, 2000-2005, by Category 
No. Category Proj ects 
N=43 % 
1 Micro and small 
enterprise/entrepreneurship 
14 32.6 
2 Micro finance 6 14.0 
3 Investment climate/overall 
prívate sector development 
13 30.2 
4 Trade and tourism 
development 
6 14.0 
5 Other 4 9.2 
Total 43 100.0 
Sonrce: Own data, 2007 
The emphasis in the 43 Inclusive Industrialisation projects is almost 
equally divided between projects focusing on small-scale activities and 
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those addressing the general investment climate and/or overall private 
sector development. The fourteen projects in the first category aim at 
the development of micro and small enterprises, foster entrepreneurship, 
and/or aim to develop income generating activities for poor people and 
vulnerable groups. Projects in this category are varied, but among them 
are those that provide training for juct kali entrepreneurs, assist women 
entrepreneurs, or create livelihood opportunities for poor people in rural 
areas. Category two is micro finance, with six projects. The third 
category cuts across the full range of private sector activities. It includes 
projects aimed at improving the investment climate or developing the 
private sector in various ways. The objectives of such projects include 
statements about improving the business environment, helping the 
government to adopt a "more congenial framework and friendlier 
policies" towards business (Project 60), and supporting private sector 
development. Category four includes six projects that specifically target 
externally focused activities such as trade and tourism. Category five 
includes four difficult-to-classify projects. One (case 26) aims to help 
municipal governments with their solid waste disposal by promoting 
small-scale activity, another (case 29) tries to link small and micro 
enterprises to export markets, another (case 39) is an environmental 
project with an enterprise component, and the fourth (case 89) has very 
vague objectives linking economic growth and poverty reduction 
through enterprise development. 
Table 5.6: Inclusive Industrialisation Projects, 2000 and 2005 by 
Category 
No. Category No. of Projects 
2000 2005 
1 Micro and small enterprise/entrepreneurship 7 7 
2 Micro finance 1 5 
3 Investment climate/overall private sector 
development 
0 13 
4 Trade and tourism development 0 6 
5 Other 0 2 
Total 8 33 
Source: Own data, 2007 
The focus of inclusive industrialisation projects has changed over time. 
In 2000, the first year of the period under study, seven out of eight 
projects were in the MSE/Entrepreneurship category (see Table 5.6). By 
2005, there were still seven projects in this categoiy, but the largest 
number of projects fell into the third category of overall private sector 
development. There were also additional projects in the micro finance, 
trade and tourism and 'other' categories. 
2 8 
IDS Working Paper No. 546 
5.2 Governance Projects and Donors 
The number of governance projects rose dramatically during the period 
2000 to 2005. From only five active projects in 2000, the number of 
projects rose steadily in the following three years, and then shot up to 
63 in 2004 and 79 in 2005 (see Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7: Active Governance Projects by Year, 2000-2005 
Year No. of Active Projects 
2000 5 
2001 8 
2002 11 
2003 15 
2004 63 
2005 79 
Source: Own data, 2007 
New projects require considerable time and effort on the part of both 
donors, national counterparts, and other recipient-country administrative 
staff. The year 2004 must have been an especially challenging year as 
48 of the 63 active projects were new and only 15 were continuing from 
previous years. In the following year, 26 of the 79 projects were new 
and 53 were continuing. 
Bilateral donors accounted for a total of 32 governance projects 
between 2000 and 2005, and multilateral donors for 70 projects (see 
Table 5.8). Of the bilateral donors, the UK's DFID funded the largest 
number of projects (8), followed by Germany (6), Sweden (5), and 
Finland (3). Denmark, the USA, the Netherlands, and Cañada each had 
two projects, and Norway and Oxfam had one each. UNDP had 35 
projects, which was more than any other donor, bilateral or multilateral. 
It should be noted that some UNDP projects have funds from other 
donors. The World Bank, with 18 projects, and UNICEF, with nine, 
also had more projects than any of the bilateral donors. Compared with 
these, the remaining multilaterals had fairly small numbers of projects. 
An examination of the donors by year reveáis a remarkable increase in 
the involvement of multilateral donors over the period, especially from 
2004 onwards (see Table 5.9). In 2000, the five active governance 
projects included four funded by bilateral agencies and one funded by 
the World Bank. Over the next three years there was a slow increase 
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Table 5.8: Projects Funded by Foreign Donor Agencies in Support of 
Governance Reform in Kenya, 2000-2005 
Foreign Donor Number of Projects 
Bilateral Donors 32 
l UK / DFID 8 
2 Germany / GTZ 6 
3 Sweden/SIDA 5 
4 Finland 3 
5 Denmark / DANIDA 2 
6 USA / USAID 2 
7 Netherlands 2 
8 Canada/CIDA 2 
9 Norway 1 
10 Oxfam 1 
Mu tilateral Donors 70 
l l UNDP 35 
12 The World Bank/IDA 18 
13 UNICEF 9 
14 EC/EU/TTF 4 
15 UNFPA 2 
16 IFAD 1 
17 ADB 1 
TO' fAL 102 
Note: The total exceeds the 92 reported projects because some projects have múltiple 
donors. Source: Own data, 2007 
Figure 5.2: Governance Reform Donors and Projects, 2000-2005 
Governance Reform 
Donors and Projects, 2000-2005 
90 
80 
— —i 1 1 1 1 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 
Year 
i$onrce: Own data 
in multilateral involvement, with governance projects by UNDP, 
World Bank, and EU. Then in 2004, there was an explosion of 
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activity, with UNDP initiating 24 new governance projects, 
World Bank increasing from four to 13, and three new 
multilateral agencies beginning projects. Additional projects carne 
on line in 2005, though the increase was not as dramatic as in the 
previous year. 
The increase in projects was much greater than the increase in 
donors, as donors who previously had a single project began to 
have múltiple projects (see Figure 5.2). 
Table 5.9: Active Governance Projects by Donor by Year, 2000-2005 
Donor Number of Active Projects 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
UK / DFID 2 2 3 2 3 5 
Germany / GTZ 1 2 3 3 5 5 
SIDA 1 1 3 2 3 3 
Denmark / 1 2 
DANIDA 
USA / USAID 1 2 2 
Netherlands 1 2 
CIDA 2 2 
Finland 1 3 
Norway 1 1 
Oxfam 1 1 
UNDP 1 1 1 25 30 
The World 1 3 2 4 13 13 
Bank/IDA 
UNICEF 6 9 
EC/EU 1 1 1 3 3 
UNFPA 2 2 
IFAD 1 1 1 
ADB 1 1 
Total No. of 5 8 11 15 63 79 
Projects 
Total No. of 4 6 6 8 17 17 
Donors 
Source: Own data, 2007 
Note: In most years, the total number of projects is less than the sums above 
because some projects have múltiple donors. 
The sharp rise in the number of projects, mainly from multilateral 
agencies, is evident in the chart. The sharp rise in the number of 
projects, mainly from multilateral agencies, is evident in the chart. 
A total of 26 agencies serve as National Implementing Agencies for the 
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governance projects (see Table 5.4). Of these 15 are government 
ministries or departments, three (KACC, KNHCR, and ICGLR) are 
other public bodies, and 8 (Nos. 19-26 in Table 5.10) areNGOs. 
Table 5.10 Number of Governance Projects by National 
Implementing Agency, 2000-2005 
National Implementing Agency No. of Projects 
1 MOJ&CA 21 
2 MOF/MOFP 17 
3 MOPND 13 
4 OP 8 
5 CBS (MOPND) 4 
6 MOHA 3 
7 MOLG 3 
8 KACC 3 
9 MOT&I and MOTTI 2 
10 MOGSC&SS 2 
11 MOI&C 2 
12 Pólice Department (OP) 1 
13 MOL 1 
14 MOE 1 
15 MOW&I 1 
16 MOA 1 
17 Secretariat ICGLR 1 
18 KNHCR 1 
19 Energy and Sustainable Development Africa 1 
20 Law Society of Kenya 1 
21 FIDA Kenya 1 
22 Eco Tourism Society 1 
23 African 2000 Plus Network 1 
24 Alwan Communications 1 
25 League of Women Voters 1 
26 Indigenous Information Network 1 
Source: Own data, 2007 
Note: The numbers add to more than the 92 reported projects because three 
projects have more than one National Implementing Agency. 
Three Ministries and the Office of the President implement more than 
half of the 92 projects (Table 5.10). Thus the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs (21), the Ministry of Finance (17),9 Ministry of 
Planning and National Development (13), and Office of the President 
(8). Other National Implementing Agencies with múltiple projects were: 
9 During the period 2000-2002, the Ministries of Finance and Planning were combined 
into a single Ministry of Finance and Planning. We have combined the two for purposes 
of this tabulation. 
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Central Bureau of Statistics (4), Ministry of Home Affairs (3), Ministry 
of Local Government (3), KACC (3), Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(2),10 Culture and Social Services (2), and Ministry of Information and 
Communications (2).The remaining fifteen agencies were administering 
one governance project each. 
The number of national implementing agencies grew steadily, from only 
two in 2000 to eight in 2003, and then surged to 20 in 2004 and 25 in 
2005 (Table 5.11). The increase in 2004 was across the board, including 
government, public agencies, and non-governmental organisations. The 
year 2004 also witnessed the addition of international agencies as 
implementers of Kenya's ODA-funded governance projects. 
The Governance projects can be categorised into nine groups, based on 
their objectives, target groups, and activities (see Table 5.12). In 
determining the categories we paid particular attention to the themes of 
GJLOS and of the Public Service Reform programme. In this sense, the 
groupings are driven by the data from Kenya. Before fmalising the 
groups, however, we examined those used in a similar study being 
carried out in Indonesia and found that they match closely. 
Table 5.12 (see page 34) shows that the most common theme is 
'Democracy, Human Rights and Rule of Law'. This theme appears 41 
times in the 92 projects. Some of these are projects aimed at improving 
participaron by all citizens, including women, those living in marginal 
areas, poor people, and others who might not easily have their voices 
heard. Others are projects with a focus on protecting the human rights 
and/or strengthening the rule of law. 
These are projects designed specifically to strengthen the capacity of the 
legal sector, in several cases in collaboration with the Law Society of 
Kenya. 'Ethics, Integrity, and Anti Corruption' appears as a theme six 
times. Most projects are aimed at the public service generally, but one is 
specifically for the pólice forcé. The three projects on 'Public Safety 
and Security' target improved capacity of the pólice to protect the 
public. The one project under the Constitutional Development theme 
aims to enhance awareness of constitutional and democratic rights, 
especially from a gender perspective. Finally, there were six projects 
that did not fit easily into any of the above categories. 
10 During the period 2000-2002, the docket of the Ministry, of Trade and Industry 
included tourism. We Have combined entries for the Ministry of Trade and Industry with 
those of the Ministry of Tourism, Trade, and Industry. 
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le 5.1 l:Implementing Agencies and Projects for Governance Reform, by 
Year, 2000-2005 
Implementing Agencies 
2000 2001 
Number of Projects 
2002 2003 2004 
National Agencies 
MOJ&CA 13 
MOF/MOFP 10 
MOPND 10 
OP 
CBS (MOPND) 
MOHA 
MOLG 
KACC 
MOT&I/MOTTI 
MOGSC&SS 
MOI&C 
Pólice Department (OP) 
MOL&HRD 
MOE 
MOW&I 
MOA 
Secretariat ICGLR 
KNHCR 
Energy & Sustainable 
Development Africa 
Law Society of Kenya 
FIDA Kenya 
Eco Tourism Society 
African 2000 Plus 
Network 
Alwan Communications 
League of Women 
Voters 
Indigenous Information 
Network 
International Agencies 
UNDP/UNDP-DEX 
UNIFEM 
Total No. of Agencies 8 22 
No of National Agencies 8 20 
:e: Own data, 2007 
The numbers add to more than the 92 reported projects because some projects have 
more than one Implementing Agency. 
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Table 5.12: Distribution of Governance Themes 
No. Theme Projects 
N=92 % 
1 Ethics, Integrity and Anti Corruption 6 6.5 
2 Democracy, Human Rights and Rule 
of Law 
41 44.6 
3 Justice, Law and Order 10 10.9 
4 Public Safety and Security 3 3.3 
5 Constitutional Development 1 1.1 
6 Legal Sector Reform 7 7.6 
7 Capacity for Strategic Leadership and 
Change Management 
29 31.5 
8 Public Service Reform 14 15.2 
9 Other 6 6.5 
Total 117 100.0 
Sonrce: Own data, 2007 
Note: The total adds to more than 92 because 21 projects contain aspects of two of the 
themes and two projects contain elements of three themes. Percentages are 
based on the number of projects. 
Section 6 
Findings on Donor Coordination 
Donor coordination is prescribed as the antidote for donor and project 
proliferation. This section reviews the coordination structures and 
activities that existed in the period 2000-2005. Before taking up 
sectoral-level coordination efforts, we look briefly at overall aid 
coordination. 
i 
6.1 Overall Aid Coordination 
Aid coordination in Kenya involves the Kenya Government and its 
development partners. Coordination is the comprehensive process 
described schematically in Figure 3.2 that includes both donor 
harmonisation and donor-recipient alignment mechanisms. The main 
coordinating bodies are summarised in Table 6.1 below. 
The period 2000-2005 saw significant changes in both donor 
harmonisation and the interactions between donors and the Kenya 
Government. At the start of the period, little was happening. Many 
donors had withdrawn their support from the Government and 
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redirected their attention to non-state actors (D4)." Only a few, such as 
Sweden, UNDP, and the World Bank, maintained their relationship with 
the Government, though at reduced funding levels. The 1996 
Consultative Group meeting took place in Paris and proved to be the • • • 12 • last such meeting of the Moi regime. According to one donor, the Moi 
regime was indifferent to coordination. "This was evident in the 1990s 
when the initial co-ordination efforts were mounted by the donors. They 
brought negative reactions from Government, and many donors in turn, 
began to avoid the country." (D4) 
Table 6.1: Coordinating Bodies, Membership, and Task(s) 
Coordinating Body Membership Task 
Consultative Group 
(CG) 
Donors, jointly chaired by 
Government and the 
World Bank 
Overall country aid 
coordination 
Donor Coordination 
Group (DCG) 
Ambassadors and heads 
of donor agencies, under 
chairmanship of Ministry 
of Finance 
High-level 
coordination, especially 
on political issues 
Harmonisation, 
Alignment and 
Coordination Group 
(HAC) 
Donor representatives 
with government 
participation, under 
chairmanship of one of 
the donors 
Coordínate with 
Government, facilitate 
donor harmonisation 
and alignment, 
streamline procedures 
Sector Working 
Groups (SWG) 
Donors working in 
particular sector together 
with Government 
representatives of that 
sector 
Facilitate coordination 
within the sector 
Source: DAC (2007) and various donor and government interviews 
When in January 2003, a new regime took power following President 
Moi's defeat at the polis, there was immediate interest on the part of 
both donors and the Government to establish better relations. Several 
donors supported Government in the preparation of the Economic 
Recovery Strategy (ERS) document (Kenya 2003), which was intended 
to establish the policy context for the following five years (Gl). When 
11 References to donor interviews are coded with the letter 'D' and a number, and those 
to government interviews with 'G' and a number. 
" The World Bank organised the first Consultative Group for Kenya in the early 1970s. 
This group met regularly throughout the 1970s and 1980s, normally once every two 
years. In the early 1990s, as donor concerns over economic management grew, there 
were meetings in both 1990 and 1991, as well as meetings of donors without the 
government's presence. Programme aid to Kenya was suspended between 1991 and 
1993. Following its resumption, four CG meetings were held between 1993 and 1995 
(O'Brien and Ryan 2001). 
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the Consultative Group met on 24-25 November 2003, the changed 
circumstances were evident. The meeting was held in Nairobi and was 
jointly chaired by the World Bank and the Government of Kenya. One 
of the key outcomes of the meeting was agreement on the importance of 
enhanced donor harmonisation and alignment, with the ERS as its 
central focus and reference point (Kenya and World Bank, 2003). 
Government and the donors agreed that there was a need for regular 
donor-Government meetings, and that Government should work 
towards a single annual timetable to integrate the ERS and budget 
processes. Moreover, the Government said that it planned to draw up an 
aid policy. The donors agreed to produce an annual report that would 
describe the progress they were making on harmonisation. All agreed 
that there was need to discuss the donor coordination mechanism. 
A direct outcome of the 2003 Consultative Group meeting was the 
establishment of the Harmonisation, Alignment, and Coordination 
Donor Group (HAC) in early 2004 (DAC 2007; HAC. 2006). The 
Donor Coordination Group (DCG), consisting of heads of donor and 
UN Agencies and their staffs in Nairobi and co-chaired by the World 
Bank and UNDP, also revived. The HAC Group, however, became the 
main donor forcé for coordination and alignment. It consists of fifteen 
donors: Cañada, Denmark, UK, EC, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, USA, and the World 
Bank. The Swedish Ambassador served as the first chair of the HAC. 
Office space for the secretariat is provided by the World Bank. 
Since its inception HAC has been very active, meeting every two 
weeks. Nevertheless, it is clear that not all donors are equally 
enthusiastic about participation (D4, D9). One of the major initiatives of 
HAC is the development of a Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) 
for 2007-2012. This would replace the individual donor assistance 
strategies. Discussions in the HAC seemed to favour rationalising aid 
by having each donor'concéntrate on only a few sectors. Yet, as one 
respondent pointed out: "Whereas the spirit of donor coordination 
requires only a limited number of donors in a given sector, donors often 
want to be in as many sectors as possible" (D4). The target for 
completing the KJAS was April 2007, so it obviously did not directly 
affect aid in the 2000-2005 period. 
UN agencies particípate in coordination in Kenya through UNDP's 
membership in HAC, but the UN also maintains its own strategic 
planning processes for coordinating and harmonising aid from various 
UN agencies operating in a country (see Table 3.2). 
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According to the UNDP respondent, the UN system is based on the 
agreements set out in the Rome Declaration (D6). For Kenya, this 
involved a Common Country Assessment, conducted in 2001/2002, 
which identified challenges and priorities that deserve new and 
continued programmatic focus by the UN System. This led to the 
preparation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF), to serve as the framework for coordinating UN system 
development assistance to Kenya for the period 2004-2008. The four 
strategic areas of cooperation identified in UNDAF for Kenya are: 
1. Promotion of good governance 
2. Reduction of the incidence and socio-economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. 
3. Strengthening of national and local systems for emergency 
preparedness, prevention, response and mitigation. 
4. Promotion of sustainable livelihoods 
UNDAF led to the development of a Countiy Programme Action Plan 
(CPAP) which is a five-year framework for defining mutual cooperation 
between the Government of Kenya and the United Nations, covering the 
period 2004-2008. Programme components are organised by outcomes. 
Related activities are described in annual work plans, which become 
annexes to CPAP. According to the respondent, "this new arrangement 
is meant to address the problem of project or donor proliferation." (D6) 
Kenya's aid coordination also includes sectoral working groups 
(SWGs), designed to bring together donors operating in particular 
sectors to share ideas and coordínate their activities (see Table 6.1). 
These are part of the overall coordination structure and their chairs are 
given TORs by the HAC secretariat. Nevertheless, they have been 
described as "loose networks without clear terms of reference" (D5). 
Another respondent was less concerned about TORs. Arguing that 
donor coordination had partly resulted in competition between donor 
projects with some pet projects getting lost, she said that donors have to 
negotiate with Government Ministries in order to ensure that their pet 
programmes/projects are included in the strategic plans of the relevant 
Government ministries (DI). Strategic donor interest in particular 
sectors was seen as one reason why coordination is diffícult (D9). 
Another is differences in organisation. Some aid agencies like DFID are 
quite decentralised, while others like JICA are centralised. This, 
according to one donor, makes joint decision-making diffícult (D9). 
In addition to participating in these donor-led structures, Government 
has its own set of internal aid coordinating mechanisms. These are 
spelled out in some detail in the annex to the draft External Resources 
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Table 6.2: Kenya Government Organs Involved in Aid Harmonisation and 
Coordination 
Ministry Organ/Depart 
ment 
Role and Relevant Function 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Minister 
Overall ODA Policy coordination and 
management 
• Solicits ODA funding, signs ODA 
contracts 
External 
Resources 
Department 
Identifíes, negotiates, and secures sources 
of external funding on behalf of the 
Government 
• Undertakes overall ODA coordination 
• Monitors ODA inflows 
• Expedites authorisation of disbursement 
of donor funds to implementing agencies 
Coordinates donor-Government 
consultative meetings 
Facilitates provisión of technical 
assistance from donors to Government 
ministries and departments 
Oversees the integration of ODA funds 
with the domestic resources via the 
national budget process 
• Ensures full involvement in appraisal of 
new projects 
• Facilitates line agencies in external 
resources monitoring and evaluation 
ERD HAC 
Committee 
• Sets Government agenda, taking into 
account issues of donor coordination as 
envisaged in Paris Declaration 
Sector 
Working 
Groups 
• Ensure sector policy consistency 
• Link with donor SWGs 
Debt 
Management 
Department 
• Evaluates appropriateness of ODA 
Accountant 
General 
• Releases ODA funds to Implementing 
Agencies 
Ministry of 
Planning and 
National 
Development 
National 
Monitoring 
and Evaluation 
Unit 
• Monitoring and Evaluation 
Central 
Planning Units 
• Coordination, planning and analysis of 
donor projects at the line ministries. 
Source: Own compilation from Kenya (2006a; 2007d), G4; 
39 
IDS Working Paper No. 546 
Policy (Kenya 2006a) and on the Ministry of Finance's website. Those 
most relevant to the discussion of aid coordination are presented in 
Table 6.2. The Ministry of Finance has the major responsibility for 
coordinating external resources. The Minister is charged with overall 
ODA policy coordination and management. He also, in collaboration 
with line ministries, solicits ODA funding and signs all ODA contracts. 
The External Resources Department (ERD) carries out tasks ranging 
from identifying sources of external funding to facilitating the line 
agencies in monitoring and evaluation of the projects they are 
managing. The ERD has reorganised its structure into twelve divisions 
which cover all projects from a particular countiy or donor group.13 
ERD also has a programme coordination unit, disbursement unit, and 
technical assistance unit. Other organs/departments within the Ministry 
of Finance are charged with ensuring policy consistency, linking with 
donor sector working groups, evaluating the appropriateness of ODA 
from a debt management perspective, and releasing ODA funds to the 
implementing agencies. The ERD HAC Committee consists of ERD's 
divisional heads and is chaired by the Director, ERD. The Committee 
sets the Government agenda and ensures that the issues of donor 
coordination as provided for in the Paris Declaration receive adequate 
attention. 
Finally, the Ministry of Planning and National Development, through its 
National Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, undertakes the monitoring 
and evaluation of aid projects. Through its Central Planning Unit, the 
Ministry of Planning and National Development is responsible for 
coordination, planning and analysis of donor projects at the line 
ministries. 
With this background we turn to the analysis of the coordination of aid 
in the two sectors under study. 
6.2 Coordination of Inclusive Industrialisation Donors and Projects 
This section looks at the extent and forms of coordination of activities 
in support of Inclusive Industrialisation. During the period under 
examination, there was a fair amount of donor activity, but very little 
attempt at coordination. In 2005 there were thirty-three active projects 
13 The divisions as of June 2007 are Africa and Regional Organisations; World Bank; 
Commonwealth, World Food Programme, IFAD/FAO, and UNICEF; Americas, 
including Latin America and Caribbean; Europe I (Nordic Countries); Europe II 
(Germany, France, Italy, Spain); Asia/Pacific (Japan, China, Korea, Russia); European 
Union; Middle East and Arab Countries; Global Fund; UN Agencies. The ERD 
Disbursement Unit is the twelfth división. 
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funded by eleven donors (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). There were no 
SWAps or other large multi-donor programmes among the thirty-three. 
Our interview with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, however, 
identifíed an important project leading to a SWAp. Its main aim was to 
develop and produce the Private Sector Development Strategy 2006-
2010 (PSDS), which was launched in early 2007. Donors offered to 
support its development at the Consultative Group Meeting held in 
April 2005 (Kenya Consultative Group Meeting 2005). 
Work apparently began almost immediately. It was funded under the 
Business Sector Programme Support project (case 104). Our list shows 
the donor for this project as DANIDA, but sources within ERD said that 
other donors were involved and they most likely channelled their funds 
for the writing of the PSDS through DANIDA. 
Donor Harmonisation: During the period 2000-2005, donors had a 
Sector Working Group on Private Sector Development. One donor said 
that the group met approximately every six weeks, but that the meetings 
became more frequent during the time of preparation of the Private 
Sector Development Strategy (D5). During this time, the quality of 
meetings also improved. Previously meetings were fairly informal, with 
donors keeping their own notes. Since the development of PSDS, the 
group has designated a chair and minutes are officially taken and 
circulated. This is an improvement, but it is costly in terms of donor 
time (D5). One of our research team had the opportunity to particípate 
in a Private Sector Development Strategy Group meeting in late 2006. 
During the meeting donors deliberated on various planned projects 
presented by members of the group, offering input and cautions based 
on experiences from Kenya and other African countries. Since the 
PSDS work began, subgroups focusing on business development 
services, trade, tourism, land, infrastructure, transport and financial 
services have also emerged (D5). These experiences point to good 
efforts at coordination. Yet another respondent said that one of the 
donors funding the PSDS did not consult with others, but instead 
preferred to deal directly with the Ministry (G5). 
Intra-Government Harmonisation: In this sector, coordination within 
Government has been problematic for some time, partly because of lack 
of clarity about the división of labour between the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MOTI) and the Ministry of Labour and Human Resource 
Development (MOLHRD) with regard to micro and small enterprise 
development. Respondents at the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
expressed the view that the two ministries should have distinct roles, 
with MOTI focusing on the core business of trade and industry, and 
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MOLHRD focusing on training issues (Gl, G5). MOLHRD, through 
the Department of Micro and Small Enterprise Development (DMSED), 
coordinates a range of activities country-wide aimed at supporting 
MSEs and their associations (G6). According to the Director of 
DMSED, most of this work is currently being done through the 
Government budget, without donor funding. Nevertheless, the functions 
of the Department of Micro and Small Enterprise (DMSED) listed on 
the MOLHRD website, seem to perpetúate the confusion of roles 
between MOLHRD and MOTI (Kenya 2007b). According to one 
respondent, "attempts to harmonise the operations ... have been 
frustrated mainly due to lack of political good will from both sides" 
(G5). Others seem to want to downplay the conflict of roles, lest it 
appear to be a conflict of persons. Still others - and the Director of 
DMSED is among these - argüe that the ministerial location of DMSED 
is not especially important; what matters is that there is such a 
department for the promotion and development of micro and small 
enterprises in Kenya. What is clear is that there is a need for a fully 
fledged department for SME. The most logical location for such a 
department appears to be the Ministry of Trade and Industry, because 
this would allow for coordination through the new private sector 
development strategy. A second coordination challenge lies with the 
projects that are being implemented by neither MOTI ñor MOLHRD. 
Table 5.4 shows that there were four projects in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, three in the Ministry of Finance, and one in the Ministry of 
Tourism and Wildlife. A MOTI representative at the Nairobi 
stakeholders' workshop said that MOTI works closely with the 
ministries implementing such projects, but the precise mechanisms for 
such coordination are not clear. Ñor is it clear how projects managed by 
NGOs are coordinated. 
Donor-Recipient Alignment: As far as we can see, no overall 
mechanism for donor-recipient coordination existed during the period 
2000-2005 (D7). Our interview with a respondent at the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry underscored some of the problems: 
"Donors still come with different approaches 
and demands that disrupt plans in place. A case 
in point is the study carried out by donors in 
2002 on competitiveness. On the basis of this 
study, they zeroed in to support the micro and 
small enterprise sector. The sector then ended 
up with many donors but no direction." (Gl) 
The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry, was meeting 
with the donor's Sector Working Group around the PSDS. In fact, one 
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of the donors commended the PS for his role in leading the group (D5). 
This was no doubt valuable and opened up channels of communication, 
but it is doubiful that it could substitute for a mechanism to coordinate 
the existing projects in the sector. 
Much hope is being pinned on the Private Sector Development Strategy, 
which is gradually being put into effect (Kenya 2006b). It has a 
comprehensive implementation framework that provides for all levels of 
coordination. The experience of the GJLOS programme, however, 
suggests that institutional frameworks that look good on paper are not 
automatically translated into active coordination. 
6.3 Coordination in the Governance Sector 
This section looks at the extent of donor and project coordination in the 
Governance sector in Kenya. A quick review of the quantitative data 
shows that there were 79 projects active in 2005 (see Table 5.9). 
Discussions with donors and government officials reveal that among 
these are two large multi-donor projects: The Governance, Law and 
Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Programme, and the Public Service 
Reform and Development (PSRD) programme. Together these account 
for approximately 25 of the 79 projects.14 GJLOS is coordinated as a 
SWAp with a structure that includes donors, government, and civil 
society. PSRD has a secretariat, headed by a Permanent Secretary, 
within the Office of the President. Some of the remaining fifty or so 
projects are loosely grouped according to their objectives (e.g., public 
finance, parliamentary strengthening, electoral process), but 
coordination is essentially lefit to the national implementing agencies. 
The next three sections analyse coordination separately for GJLOS, 
PSRD, and then in the remaining projects. Following the conceptual 
framework presented in section 3.4, we first describe the coordinating 
structures, and then examine three sets of coordinating activities: donors 
coordinating with each other (donor harmonisation), coordination of the 
various arms of Government (government harmonisation), and 
coordination of Government with the donors (donor-recipient 
alignment).15 
14 Some of the projects are easily identifiable by their titles, but others are not. GJLOS 
has sixteen donors and there appear to be some additional projects, so we estímate that 
GJLOS may account for 16-20 projects. PSRD has six donors, so we estímate 6-8 
projects. As we continué to collect and verify data, we will try to refine these figures. 
15 We note that in an early interview, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry pointed out these three levels of coordination. 
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6.3.1 Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform (GJLOS) 
The GJLOS Programme is jointly funded by sixteen donors and 
includes a wide range of activities under four sector-wide reform 
priorities: governance reforms, human rights reforms, justice reforms, 
and law and order reforms (GJLOS Programme Coordination Office 
2005; Kenya 2005a). The GJLOS Reform Programme was launched as 
a five-year programme. This was then subsequently broken down into a 
one-year (July 2004-June 2005) Short-Term Priorities Programme 
(STPP) of "quick wins", and a four year Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) 
of deep-seated reform running from July 2005 to June 2009. One of the 
outputs of the first year was a detailed document spelling out the 
medium-term strategy for sector-wide reforms (Kenya 2005a). 
The programme is organised as a SWAp. Government sees this 
approach as recognising systemic inter-dependencies that cut across the 
sector (Kenya 2007c) and thus going beyond "traditional, narrow, 
institutional approaches to reform" (Kenya 2005a). Funding is provided 
by the Government of Kenya and the group of 16 donors. The donors 
fall into three categories. In Category 1 are five donors who contribute 
to the basket fund for support of the entire programme. In Category 2 
are ten donors with particular arrangements with the Government for 
support to specific parts of the programme that fall within these 
partners' mandates. Finally, in Category 3 are three donors who channel 
their contribution to the programme through multilateral donors.16 
The Medium-Term Strategy (Kenya 2005a) and the Joint Statement of 
Intent (Kenya 2005b) are the basic documents of GJLOS. The MTS 
establishes the programme agenda, while the Joint Statement of Intent 
spells out agreement among all the partners. It covers the partnership 
principies; framework for collaboration between Government of Kenya 
and the Development Partners; goals of the programme and scope of the 
statement of intent; ownership and sustainability of the programme; 
responsibilities, representation, organisational structure, and funding 
arrangements; consultation and decisión malcing; review and evaluation; 
and various details, such as reporting and disbursement procedures, that 
are usually found in funding agreements. The Joint Statement of Intent 
(JSI) makes explicit the intention of the Government and the 
Development Partners to work within the framework of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005b). The JSI also 
safeguards the SWAp. All fínancing agreements must mention the JSI. 
The programme has a complex governance and partnership framework, 
16 Two donors in this last category also give through the basket fund, so the total 
number of donors signing the Joint Statement of Intent is 16. 
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as indicated in Figure 6.1 below. 
Figure 6.1: GJLOS Governance Structure 
GJLOS GOVERNANCE & PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK 
Source: GJLOS Project Coordination Office 
The institutional framework for GJLOS has eight management bodies: 
1. Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC) is a cabinet-level 
committee that provides political, policy, and overall strategic 
leadership; 
2. Technical Coordination Committee is a representative, 
decision-making stakeholder forum that also serves as 
executive link between IASC and Thematic Groups; 
3. Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA) is the 
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coordinating ministry;17 
4. Ministries, Departments and Agencies sit on Thematic Groups 
relevant to their area; 
5. Thematic Groups provide a forum for implementation tracking, 
experience sharing, and early problem resolution; 
6. Development Partners Consultative Forum (or Donors Group) 
links all donors to programme coordination and basket-fimd 
donors to FMA; 
7. Programme Coordination Office acts as a secretariat to the 
Technical Coordination Committee in the coordination of 
GJLOS implementation; and 
8. Financial Management Agent (FMA) serves as financial arm of 
donors in the basket fund. 
This structure places Government in control (through the Inter-Agency 
Steering Committee), provides the opportunity for donors to 
communicate with one another (through the Donor Group), and offers 
avenues for donor-government interaction (through the Technical 
Coordination Committee and Thematic Groups). It also allows for more 
detailed input from the 32 ministries, departments and agencies 
participating in the programme (see Box 6,1) as well as from three focal 
points representing the private sector, civil society, and the development 
partners. The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs has a dual 
role, as the coordinating ministry for the overall GJLOS reform 
programme, and as an implementing institution with its own GJLOS 
reform role and mandate. 
The Programme Coordination Office and Financial Management Agent 
are parallel institutions established because donors still feel that they are 
necessary to ensure efficient coordination and financial management of 
the programme (DIO, DI, and D8). The Joint Statement of Intent 
(Kenya 2005b) provides that "The continuation of the PCO as part of 
the programme will be dependent upon the results of the mid-term 
evaluation that will include an assessment of the need to extend the 
PCO." The Financial Management Agency manages the basket fund 
created by the five donors in Category 1 (sometimes referred to as "B-
Donors"). The remaining donors are "direct donors" who contribute to 
particular activities. The level of direct funding has been diminishing; at 
the same time, the proportion of government funding in the project has 
been increasing (Gil). The fund manager is on a short-term renewable 
contract. This may mean that capacity building of Government staff is 
17 In the terms we have been using, it is the National Implementing Agency. 
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not in the manager's interest as it may result in loss of the contract (DI). 
Box 6.1: GJLOS Ministries, Departments, and Agencies 
The 32 min'stries, departments, agencies participating in GJLOS are the 
following: 
I. Office of the President - Provincial Administration and Internal Security 
1. Kenya Pólice 
2. Administration Pólice 
3. Provincial Administration 
4. National Agency for Campaign Against Drug Abuse (NACADA) 
5. Department of Governance and Ethics 
II. Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons 
6. Department of Immigration 
7. Department of Civil Registration 
8. National Registration Bureau 
III. Office of the Vice President and Ministry of Home Affairs 
9. Prisons 
10. Probation and Añercare Services 
11. Children's Services 
12. Community Service Orders 
IV. Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
13. General Administration and Sector Leadership 
14. Department of Legal Affairs 
15. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
16. Kenya Law Reform Commission 
17. Kenya School of Law 
18. National Anti-corruption Steering Committee 
19. GJLOS Reform Programme Coordination Office 
V. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
20. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
VI. Judiciary 
21. Judiciary 
22. Judicial Service Commission 
23. National Council for Law Reporting/Kenya Law Reports 
VII. State Law Office/Office of the Attorney General 
24. Office of the Attorney General 
25. Office of the Solicitor General 
26. Advócate Complaints Commission 
27. Public Prosecutions 
28. Civil Litigation 
29. Legislative Drafting 
30. Treaties and Agreements 
31. Public Trustee/Administrator General 
32. Registrar General 
Source: Kenya (2007c) and various interviews 
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The strueture of GJLOS provides for interactions among donors, 
between the various ministries, departments and agencies of the Kenya 
Government, and between donors and the Government. We analyse the 
extent to which these actually happened and whether they positively 
contributed to the coordination of the GJLOS Programme. 
Donor Harmonisation: One donor made the point that donors often do 
not have a common position and have to work for a consensus. Each 
donor has its own agenda, and dynamics within the Donor Group are 
not always smooth. Political priorities of donor home countries and 
home-country perceptions of the recipient are critical determinants of 
how funds are channelled and managed. The same donor said that 
coordination among donors is costly, estimating that each donor agency 
spends about four hours per week in coordination activities. (DI). 
Policies governing aid also differ from one donor to another. Some, 
such as the World Bank and USAID, are not allowed to particípate in 
basket funds so they provide their funding directly (Kenya 2005b) DI). 
This removes them from the FMA and could make them less sensitive 
to problems surrounding its existence. One donor pointed out that there 
are advantages to taking a coordinated approach, but there are also risks 
(D4). 
Coordination also encourages standardised approaches which make the 
aid process more predictable. Nevertheless, when working together 
there is a higher risk of collapsing/falling together. Also big donors fear 
that coordination will give small ones a way to be more influential. 
Donors of all sizes fear loss of visibility. Yet with all of these caveats 
and difficulties, one donor described the level of coordination in the 
governance sector as "amazing" (D7). 
Intra-Government Harmonisation: At the level of agenda-setting for 
GJLOS, coordination appears to be weak. Neither the Inter-Agency 
Steering Committee ñor the Technical Coordination Committee meets 
regularly (Pearson and Associates 2007). Govermnent participation in 
Theme Groups is also weak. One respondent analysed the problem in 
terms of the operating and incentive structures of government. 
Govermnent, he said, is organised vertically from the Minister through 
the various levels of directors and officers. Reform efforts such as 
performance contracting have only reinforced this vertical strueture by 
strengthening incentives for civil servants to contribute to meeting the 
targets of their home ministry (Dll) . In such a setting, people are 
unlikely to make participation in horizontal structures that cut across 
ministries a priority. 
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All of this, however, means that the Government is not taking 
advantage of the oppoitunity provided by the IASC to set direction for 
GJLOS, and further that the opportunities for more detailed discussions 
that might happen within the TCC are also being foregone. Financially, 
there is also a problem of lack of linkage with Médium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and other budgetary processes 
(Pearson and Associates 2007). Finally, at the level of operations the 
main hindrance to effective coordination within government appears to 
be the separation of GJLOS from the mainstream of government 
operations (G5, (Pearson and Associates 2007). The existence of the 
two parallel institutions - the FMA and PCO - reinforces this 
separation. A Government respondent made the point several times that 
the FMA is now unnecessary because of improvements to government 
financial and procurement systems (G4). Even donors who disagree 
with this recognise that the FMA has not built capacity in Government 
(D7). Capacity building for project coordination is also lacking. The 
head of the coordination office is an expatríate. The others are Kenyans 
who were hired in a competitive process from outside of Government. 
There is no government officer who is involved in the coordination with 
the ultímate objective of acquiring the skills to carry out the 
coordination when these expatriates leave (G5). One donor also raised 
the issue of salaries in the PCO (D7). One Government respondent 
expressed the view that Technical Coordination Committee is also a 
parallel unit, and is not integrated into the structures of the Ministry 
(DIO). Despite these difficulties, some important steps appear to have 
been taken towards better coordination within Government. The Mid-
Term Review highlights cooperation between different departments in 
identifying areas of core competence and avoiding duplication, 
involvement of sectors and departments traditionally viewed as 
conservative and exclusive, and active participation of high level GOK 
officials as major milestones (Pearson and Associates 2007). In 
addition, there has been some reorganisation in the External Resources 
Department, especially the realignment of desks managing different 
agencies and the updating of systems (G4). It is not clear whether these 
changes are attributable to GJLOS in particular or more generally to 
efforts to coordínate aid more effectively. 
Donor-Recipient Alignment: At the level of agenda, donor-recipient 
coordination is evident in major documents, especially the Joint 
Statement of Intent and the GJLOS Reform Programme Medium-Term 
Strategy document (Kenya 2005a; Kenya 2005b). These documents 
were produced through an intense collaborative effort, with the 
intention that they would guide the reform programme. Yet problems 
remain on both the donor and recipient side that make ongoing 
49 
IDS Working Paper No. 546 
coordination difficult. There is the concern that the GJLOS MTEF has 
not been fully integrated into Government. There is also concern that 
even after signing the Joint Statement of Intent, some donors want to 
impose additional conditionalities (DIO). The bilateral interests of 
donors sometimes take precedence over agreed agenda. The further 
development and specifícation of the GJLOS agenda is hampered by the 
lack of regular Theme Group meetings (Pearson and Associates 2007). 
One donor said that the Theme Group meetings are long and that it is 
often not easy to reach a consensus (D9). Several others said that it 
takes long to reach decisions. At the level of operations, coordination 
has increased, but there are still some major differences between donors 
and the Kenya Government. One donor expressed the view that the 
pulling together of donors in GJLOS had reduced the fragmented 
approach and eased the burden of the government of reporting to 
different donors (DI). Both donors and the Government expressed the 
view that coordination has resulted in lower transactions costs for 
Government (D3, G4), though donors said that it has increased their 
transactions costs (DI). Government and donors disagree on whether 
Government systems have improved suffíciently to be used for aid 
funds (G4). The PCO and FMA are required by donors, yet clearly 
resented by Government. Whether they are necessary or not, their 
current mode of operation is not creating capacity that will affect the 
• • • IR 
sustainability of the reform programme. GJLOS has been negatively 
affected by the limited multi-year projections for donor funds, as well as 
their lack of predictability (Pearson and Associates 2007). This has 
caused budgeting problems and delays in implementation. These are the 
kinds of problems that coordination is supposed to elimínate! 
Thus, this large, complex and, on paper, coordinated project is less 
coordinated than it at first appears. The lack of coordination reduces the 
effectiveness of the programme, but one should not lose sight of some 
of the very real gains brought about by Kenya's first attempt to use a 
SWAp in the Governance sector. 
6.3.2 Public Service Reform 
The Public Service Reform programme is charged with coordinating all 
public service reform efforts, including especially the implementation 
of a Results Based Management System (Kenya 2007e). The 
programme is managed from within Government by a Permanent 
Secretary in the Office of the President (G3). It began in 2005, and is 
18 By mid 2007, Government and the donors had agreed to a one-year extensión of the 
FMA with the proviso that by the end of that year the financial and procurement 
arrangements for GJLOS would be integrated into government systems (DI 1). 
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funded by five donors.19 The institutional framework for the programme 
is shown in Box 6.2 below. 
The placement of the programme within the Office of the President 
should ensure Government ownership. The programme structure 
includes high-level representation of both Government and donors. 
Explicit inclusión of representatives of the HAC and the Development 
Partners' Coordination Group is a positive step. Furthermore, the 
Permanent Secretary who coordinates this programme also sits on the 
GJLOS Thematic Group on Leadership and Management Development 
(GJLOS Programme Coordination Office 2005). This should facilitate 
coordination with this sector-wide programme. 
Box 6.2: Institutional Framework for Implementing Results Based 
Management 
1. Cabinet 
2. Cabinet Standing Committee on Public Service Reforms 
3. National Steering Committee 
4. PSR&DS 
5. Ministerial /Institutional Management Steering Committee 
6. Ministerial/Institutional Management Units 
7. PSR&D Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee 
8. Ministerial/Institutional Public-Private Stakeholder Forum 
9. Joint PSR GoK /Head of Agencies Consultative Meeting (HAC) 
10. Joint Public PSR GoK/Development Partners Coordination Group 
Source: Kenya (2007e) 
The programme is newer than GJLOS, so there is less documentaron 
available. The recently completed End-Term Review of the Pilot Rapid 
Results Initiative is not yet on the website. At this stage, therefore, we 
lack enough information for a full analysis of interaction among donors, 
interaction within government, and donor-recipient interactions. We 
present what we have with the understanding that it will be augmented 
by further interviews. 
Donor Harmonisation: All of the donors are members of HAC, and all 
are also donors to GJLOS, so one would expect that they have 
opportunities for interaction on governance reform outside of the 
structure of this programme. 
Intra-Government Harmonisation: The activities of the Results Based 
19 Details of financial arrangements are not provided on the website, and in our early 
interview with the Permanent Secretary we did not request this information. 
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Management Programme have high awareness within Government 
because they touch on civil servants' terms of service and because part 
of the programme itself - the Rapid Results Initiative ~ involves formal 
launches and leadership orientations at the level of ministries, 
departments, and agencies within and outside of Nairobi (Kenya 
2007e). Furthermore, the project's institutional framework includes a 
Cabinet Standing Committee on Public Service Reforms and a 
Ministerial/Institutional Management Steering Committee, both of 
which should ensure internal Government coordination. We do not 
know, however, how often this programme is on the agenda of the 
Cabinet Standing Committee, ñor do we know how oñen the 
Management Steering Committee meets. In addition, we lack 
information about the extent of operational coordination achieved 
among the units involved in implementing the donor-funded 
programme, ñor the effective linkages with GJLOS and other 
governance-sector projects. A final judgement on the extent of 
coordination within government will depend on the availability of such 
information. 
Donor-Recipient Alignment: The structural elements for donor-recipient 
coordination appear to be in place. Two joint structures (nos. 9 and 10 
in Box 6.2) provide for government-donor coordination. It is interesting 
to note that our donor interviews do not mention this programme. They 
may see it simply as falling under the GJLOS umbrella, it may be 
unknown to those who are not directly funding it, or its managerial 
focus may make it less interesting to them. The secretariat is within 
Government, but it is not clear how the funds are being managed. 
UNDP's contribution appears on our list of projects housed in the 
Ministry of Finance, but funds from the other four donors were not 
among the projects listed. Further information is clearly needed for an 
adequate assessment of donor-recipient coordination of the Public 
Service Reform programme. 
6.3.3 Other governance projects 
Based on the overview of donor coordination in Kenya, we would 
expect the main coordinating mechanism for the remaining projects to 
be the Sector Working Group. Our interviews with both donors and 
government, however, suggest that there is no effective Sector Working 
Group for the governance sector as a whole. Most respondents, when 
questioned about the governance sector talked about GJLOS. Only one 
respondent referred directly to a Sector Working Group, and he said that 
it has not worlced well due to lack of sector strategy, lack of 
communication, and power struggles within Govermnent (D4). 
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Section 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
Aid, not only in Kenya but throughout the world, is rapidly changing. 
One respondent, describing the situation in the sector he works in, said 
that it is like attempting to board a moving bus (DI 1): "When you think 
you know where you are, it has moved on." Despite these challenges, 
the study has yielded a number of findings that enable us to draw some 
preliminary conclusions on the forms and extent of donor and project 
proliferation and coordination in Kenya during the period 2000-2005. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The first set of findings has to do with donor and project proliferation. 
Projects and donors proliferated greatly in the between 2000 and 2005, 
but there were some differences between the inclusive industrialisation 
and governance sectors. Projects and donors proliferated in both sectors, 
with projects multiplying more rapidly than donors. The two sectors had 
a total of thirteen projects from ten donors in 2000. By 2005, they had 
112 projects from twenty-eight donors. Donors had nearly tripled, but 
projects had risen by a factor of ten. 
Project proliferation was more pronounced in governance than in 
inclusive industrialisation. Governance projects rose from five in 2000 
to seventy-nine in 2005, while inclusive industrialisation projects grew 
from eight to thirty-three in the same period. In both sectors, the big 
jump in the number of projects occurred in 2004. It is not clear how 
much of this was specific to Kenya, in particular the change of regime, 
and how much to the general availability of more aid from DAC 
countries. 
Proliferation was accompanied in both sectors by a sharp increase in the 
number of implementing agencies. In each sector a few implementing 
agencies accounted for the majority of projects, with the remaining 
projects scattered over a large number of agencies. In inclusive 
industrialisation, there was a noticeable shift towards project 
implementation by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In 2000 MOT&I 
implemented twelve per cent of all active projects. By 2005, it was 
implementing fifty-five per cent of projects. 
Government interviews and our own observations suggest that this 
proliferation had all of the expected effects: múltiple meetings 
involving high-level officials, high levels of administrative effort, 
pressures on financial and administrative systems, and so forth. 
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The second set of findings has to do with the extent and forms of aid 
coordination. We looked first at overall coordination and then at sector-
specific coordination efforts. Overall coordination involves three types 
of efforts: harmonisation among donors, intra-government 
harmonisation, and donor-recipient alignment. Efforts on all three fronts 
have been increasing, especially since the promulgation of the Rome 
and Paris Declarations in 2003 and 2005 respectively (OECD 2003b; 
OECD 2005b) and Kenya's change of government at the end of 2002. 
Until 2003 Kenya's main coordination mechanism was the Consultative 
Group, which met outside of Kenya under the chairmanship of the 
World Bank. Its main focus was donor-recipient alignment. After 
frequent meetings in the early 1990s, the Consultative Group process 
lapsed until after the change of political regime at the end of 2002. 
Donors to Kenya also used sector working groups for purposes of 
harmonising their efforts, and UN agencies have used UNDAF, though 
their usefulness appears to vary from sector to sector. A direct outcome 
of the 2003 Consultative Group meeting was the establishment of the 
Harmonisation, Alignment, and Coordination Donor Group in early 
2004. 
Intra-government harmonisation takes place through the Ministry of 
Finance, External Resources Department. ERD is making great efforts 
to capture data and manage the flow of information. It is currently 
reorganising itself in an attempt to work more efficiently and 
effectively. Most project information can be accessed through the 
relevant división in ERD. Two gaps have been identified: disbursement 
information is lacking on many projects, and agreements and other 
documentation on projects managed through parallel institutions such as 
Project Coordination Units or Financial Management Agencies is not 
generally available through ERD. 
The two sectors reflect this general picture, though with some 
variations. Inclusive Industrialisation projects are loosely coordinated at 
the donor level by the Private Sector Donor Group. This group became 
more active from mid 2005 as it became involved in developing the 
Private Sector Development Strategy. The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry took a leading role in proposing this new initiative which will 
transform the existing Private Sector Donor Group into a Private Sector 
Development Strategy Steering Committee, chaired by the head of 
Public Service and including key ministries as well as private sector 
membership. 
The governance sector has a large SWAp involving at least sixteen 
donors in the strengthening of the Governance, Justice, Law and Order 
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Sector. The SWAp is being implemented through the Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The SWAp has a complex 
coordinating strueture that includes at least two parallel institutions 
(FMA and PCO). The governance sector has a second multi-donor 
project that is being implemented through the Office of the President. 
Information about its strueture is incomplete at this stage of the 
research. In addition there are approximately fifty other governance 
projects that either stand alone or are linked with projects or 
programmes in other sectors. 
Two important documents designed to facilítate aid coordination are 
being developed. Donors to Kenya are in the process of framing a Joint 
Assistance Strategy (latest draft, dated May 2007), and the Government 
has been working for some time on its External Resources Policy 
(Fourth Draft, dated November 2006). At least one participant in the 
Nairobi stalceholders' workshop pointed out that the process of 
developing these documents has been at least as important as the 
documents themselves. 
7.2 Conclusions, Emerging Issues, and Further Research 
Both donors and the Kenya Government recognise the problems 
associated with donor and project proliferation, but despite instituting 
new approaches and strengthening existing coordination mechanisms, 
many issues remain. Donors accept in principie the thrust towards 
harmonisation and alignment outlined in the Rome and Paris 
Declarations, but some appear to find it difficult to put coordination 
ahead of their bilateral interests. Differences in the levels of 
decentralisation in aid agencies may have some impact on coordination, 
but are probably not the heart of the problem. More relevant is the need 
for agencies to be seen - by headquarters and home-country taxpayers -
as being actively involved in the fight against poverty in Africa. 
Donors and Government disagree on the necessity of using parallel 
institutions for multi-donor projects and/or SWAps. Donors say that 
Kenyan financial, procurement, and general management systems are 
not strong enough to handle such large projects efficiently and without 
corruption. Govermnent officials think that they have made 
considerable progress in strengthening these systems and resent donors' 
judgements that they are still too weak to use. Government also believes 
that little or no capacity building is being done in the existing parallel 
institutions. There is truth in all of these contentions, and it is important 
that efforts to find a constructive solution continué. The temporary 
status of the GJLOS FMA is an effort to find a constructive solution 
that will allow the FMA to continué while at the same time making 
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capacity building mandatory. 
Another issue of capacity building raised at the Nairobi workshop 
relates to the ability of government officers to negotiate aid packages. 
Donors may exert undue influence on the aid agenda and/or its financial 
and administrative systems if those on the government side lack strong 
negotiating skills. 
The fact that the GJLOS coordination structure is not fully functioning 
should be taken as a waming by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
which has outlined a similarly complex structure for the Private Sector 
Development Strategy. If the analysis that attributes the difficulties with 
the GJLOS structure to a conflict between Government's vertical 
structures and incentives and the SWAp's horizontal mechanisms may 
require some rethinking of PSDS processes and structures. 
As the Government's main aid coordinating agency, ERD, needs further 
strengthening. In particular, the conversión from paper to electronic 
records should be completed so that valuable information can be more 
easily accessed and shared. The new system needs to include 
information about projects funded through FMAs as well as those 
whose funding passes through the Treasury. 
The findings on the extent and forms of donor proliferation and 
coordination represent the conclusión of the first phase of this research. 
They set the stage for the next phase which will investigate in more 
detail the effects of proliferation and coordination on state capacity. 
Research questions to be addressed in Phase 2 of the project are: 
a. What is the actual level of transactions costs associated with 
donor and project proliferation? 
b. What is the impact of donor and project proliferation on state 
capacity? 
c. What is the impact of coordination on state capacity? 
In addition, it will be important to continué in the coming research to 
refine the concepts and theories advanced in this paper. It may be 
useful, for example, to consider coordination as a continuous variable 
ranging from simple information-sharing to fully integrated agenda 
setting. Other terms may similarly need unbundling if we are to 
understand the complex processes involved in giving, seeking, and 
using external resources. 
Two issues of concern to aid globally have hardly been discussed in this 
study. The first is the role of the Millennium Development Goals as a 
focal point for aid, and the second is the major thrust towards increasing 
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aid to Africa. The absence of the MDGs from this analysis is partly due 
to the choice of sectors for study. The MDGs would no doubt figure 
more prominently if we had included a sector such as health, education, 
or water. Recent proposals for massive aid increases to Africa need 
careful examination in the light of the findings and challenges posed in 
this paper. Greatly increased aid will only be useful for development if 
it is well managed. We hope that this study will be helpful to both 
donors and recipient countries in establishing the mechanisms to ensure 
that good management. We also recognise, however, that a study of a 
single country may not be sufficient and that further research is needed, 
especially comparative studies across African countries. 
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Appesidix 1: Project Data Template 
Project Number 
Project Title 
Foreign Donor Agency 
Foreign Executing 
Agency 
National Counterpart 
National Implementing 
Agency 
Project Status / 
Duration 
Start Date 
End Date 
Target Group 
Specific Objective 
Core Activities 
Funding 
Frreign ¡ U S S | Project Total 
National i USS Proíect Total 
Ciüuiuisíive 
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Otíttrs j US I 
t v V A L T ^ 
Project Total 
rrolcct Tctní 
% 
% 
% 
% 
Foreign 
Natsps'aí 
USS 
Tenas oí Assisíasice 
i nano! 
i Grant/Loan 
USS 
ínvolvement of 
National Institutions 
Geograprtíc Location 
Ñame of Institution: Role/ 
Activities: 
National/Provincial/District Level 
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Appendix 2: Interviews Conducted 
Interviewee Date 
1. Royal Danish Embassy 
10 April 2006 
2. USAID 
12 April 2006 
3. CIDA 
13 April 2006 
4. Swedish Ambassador (Chair HAC) 
25 April 2006 
5. PS, OP 26 July 2006 
6. PS, MOT&I 5 May 2006 
7. MOF, Director, External Resources 20 November 2006 
Department 
8. UNDP 5 December 2006 
9. World Bank 20 December 2006 
10. EU 
24 January 2007 
11. ERD, Asia Pacific Desk 
3 March 2007 
12. Director, ERD 
17 April 2007 
13. Germany-GTZ 
24 April 2007 
14. MOT&I 
2 May 2007 
15. MOJCA-GJLOS PCO, Chief Technical 
8 May 2007 
Coordinator 
16. Embassy of Japan 
7 May 2007 
17. MOLHRD, Department of MSE, Director 23 July 2007 
18. MOJCA-GJLOS PCO, Strategy, Planning, 
24 July 2007 
Budgeting 
64 
IDS Working Paper No. 546 
Appendix 3: Interview Guides 
a) Guide for Government 
DONOR PROLIFERATION AND STATE CAPACITY RESEARCH 
PROJECT 
Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi 
Interview Schedule for Government Officials, Department of External 
Resources, Ministry of Finance/Treasury 
Main question: How does proliferation of donor agencies and projects affect 
state capacity in recipient countries? 
Sectors of focus: Small and Médium Enterprises; and Governance 
Time frame: 2000-2005. 
Defining State Capacity: The ability to design policies and programmes and 
implement them in an authoritative and binding fashion. 
An over view of 
donor proliferation 
1. How do you describe the level of donor 
activity in Kenya? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• Why this level of activity? 
2. What is the number of projects? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• Why this number of projects? 
3. What are the differences between: 
• Donors? 
• Sectors? 
4. What are some of the changes experienced 
generally and in the two sectors between 2000 
and 2005 with regard to: 
• The number of donors? 
• The number of projects? 
• New donors and donors dropping off? 
• Shiñ in interests? 
Effects of donor 
proliferation 
5. What are the effects of having many 
donors/projects in a particular sector? 
6. Have there been any particular effect (s) of 
donors/projects generally and in the two 
sectors with regard to the following: 
• Transaction costs incurred by the 
government, donor or both? 
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• Government's ability to develop and 
pursue a strategic approach (i.e. design 
and implementation of policies and 
programmes in the sectors)? 
• Government's ability to learn from good 
and bad experiences? 
• Formation of parallel organizations like 
Project Implementation Units? 
• Types of parallel organisations formed 
(i.e. external, internal and consultancies)? 
• Reason(s) for their formation and their 
numbers over a period of 2000 to 2005? 
Are there efforts by the government to 
overcome proliferation? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• If yes, what are they? 
• What is the motivation? 
• The outcomes? 
• Some of the strengths and weaknesses? 
8. What are their particular impacts on the levels 
of transaction costs? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• On the government? 
• On the donors? 
9. What is the general reaction of donors to such 
initiatives? 
Overcoming donor 
proliferation 
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b) Guide for Donors 
DONOR PROLIFERATION AND STATE CAPACITY RESEARCH 
PROJECT 
Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi 
Interview Schedule for Donor Agencies 
Main question: How does proliferation of donor agencies and projects affect 
state capacity in recipient countries? 
Sectors of focus: Small and Médium Enterprises; and Governance 
Time frame: 2000-2005. 
Defining State Capacity: The ability to design policies and programmes and 
implement them in an authoritative and binding fashion. 
An over view 1. What is the level of involvement of your organisation 
of donor in funding projects? 
proliferation • Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• Why this level of activities? 
2. How many projects does your organisation fund? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• Exactly how many in over a period of 2000 to 
2005? 
• Why this number of projects? 
3. Are your aware of some projects by other donors in 
these sectors? 
• If yes which donors? 
• Their general level of involvement? 
• The number of their projects in the two sectors? 
• Why the number of projects in the two sectors? 
4. What are the differences in terms of projects 
between: 
• Donors? 
• Sectors? 
5. Have you experienced any change(s) generally and 
in the two sectors between 2000 and 2005 with 
regard to the following: 
• Number of donors? 
• Number of projects? 
• New donors or donors dropping off? 
• Shifts in interests? 
• Reasons for the changes? 
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Effects of 
donor 
proliferation 
6. What in your view as a donor are the effects of 
having many donors/projects in a particular sector? 
7. Has there been any particular effect from the projects 
funded by your organisation in the two sectors with 
regard to the following: 
• Transaction costs incurred by the government, 
donors or both? 
• Government's ability to develop and pursue a 
strategic approach (i.e. design and 
implementation of policies and programmes in 
the sectors)? 
• Government's ability to learn from good and bad 
experiences? 
• Formation of parallel organisations like project 
implementation units? 
• Type of the parallel organisations (i.e. external. 
Internal and consultancies)? 
• Reasons for their formation in your organisation 
and their numbers between 2000 and 2005? 
Overcoming 
donor 
proliferation 
8. Are there efforts by donors or the government to 
overcome proliferation? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• If yes, how do donors go about it? 
• What is the motivation? 
• Some of the strengths and weaknesses of such 
efforts? 
9. What are their particular impacts on the levels of 
transaction costs? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• On the government? 
• On the donors? 
10. Is there a trend to fewer larger projects among 
donors? 
• Generally? 
• In the two sectors? 
• If yes what motivates them to do so? 
11. Do donors have links with each other in sectors 
where they have múltiple projects? 
• If yes what stage do they link with each other? 
• Why the link? 
12. Have you seen a change in government's approaches 
to múltiple projects? 
• The nature of change? 
• Reason for change? 
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